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TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL–POLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Haochen Sun∗ 
 The sovereign power itself . . . cannot, consistently with the principles 
of the law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a 
direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens 
of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long 
borne by a free people.1 
–Justice Kirkpatrick 
 
 [T]his taking upon ourselves the consequences for things we are 
entirely innocent of, is the price we pay for the fact that we live our lives not 
by ourselves but . . .[within a] human community.2 
–Hannah Arendt 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article puts forward a new social–political theory of the public trust 
doctrine by demonstrating that the doctrine is a legal tool that embodies both 
rights-conferring and responsibilities-imposing functions. The new theory, as the 
Article shows, is capable of yielding effective responses to the criticisms that have 
been leveled against the doctrine and the conventional theories upon which the 
doctrine was founded.  
 Based on the role of public space in human development, the Article first 
discusses how and why the public trust doctrine has functioned to protect public 
spaces by conferring upon citizens four categories of public rights. The Article 
then argues that we should regard the public trust doctrine as a legal tool to 
enforce the public trust principle as a fundamental constitutional principle 
affording citizens fundamental rights over public space that is indispensable for 
human development. The protection of the public interest under this principle 
embodies the fundamental human value of protecting public space and 
underscores the need for the legal system to be shaped in a manner that effectuates 
this human value. 
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 1. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821). 
 2. HANNAH ARENDT, RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 157–58 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2003). 
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 Moreover, the Article contends that while it grants citizens fundamental 
rights over public spaces, the public trust principle underlying the public trust 
doctrine also impresses social responsibilities upon the stakeholders regarding the 
protection of public space. Through the enforcement of social responsibilities, the 
doctrine promotes a stewardship ethic of protecting the public spaces in society. In 
this respect, the Article alters the conventional trusteeship model under the public 
trust doctrine, which deems the government to be the sole trustee responsible for 
managing public resources. It demonstrates that the social responsibility model of 
stewardship requires not only the government but also the judiciary and 
individuals as members of the public to act as the stewards of public resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Our public spaces are very vulnerable to a variety of degradations. The 
harm caused by degradations can be widespread and even irreparable. The 
recent Gulf of Mexico oil spill clearly demonstrated that an unexpected 
degradation to public space can even bring about an environmental disaster 
unprecedented in American history. Its consequences are so grave and 
widespread that many see it as a national catastrophe that not only hits hard 
the ecology of the American southeast coast, but also constitutes a crisis of 
humanity caused by human greed.3  
 Compared with the oil spill that has drawn attention at a national and 
global level, many silent degradations of public space at a local level may 
cause serious consequences to people in the locality. Recently, many people 
in Pennsylvania towns engaged in battles against the disappearance of public 
parks in their neighborhoods. Private developers had attempted to force the 
closure of these public parks and their transfer to private control.4 The 
privatization of these public parks may only affect people who live in 
neighboring communities. But these parks are vital to community life 
because they provide free and open venues in which residents can socialize 
with one another or simply relax. Thus, public parks are crucial to 
community cohesion and social bonding. They are also closely intertwined 
with individual well-being, simply because life is better with green areas and 
recreational facilities open to the public. 
 These degradations of public spaces at the national or local level raise 
the question of how to prevent or stop them both in the short and long run.  
The public trust doctrine has been invoked to address these problems.5 At 
least in the case of the public park, the public trust doctrine helped the local 
                                                                                                                  
 3. Donna Brazile, Greed, negligence behind BP oil spill, CNN.COM, May 3, 2010, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/05/03/brazile.oil.new.orleans/index.html (“The BP disaster has only one 
cause: human greed, and the almost inevitable result, negligence.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Background, SAVE KARDON PARK, http://savekardonpark.com/3.html (last visited Jan. 20, 
2011) (explaining citizens’ efforts to prevent developers from building a large housing and commercial 
development in Kardon Park); Burholme Park, PUBLIC VOICE FOR PUBLIC SPACE, http://www. 
publicvoiceforpublicspace.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=7:burholme-
park&layout=blog&Itemid=18 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (discussing community members’ success at blocking 
the development of Burholme Park); Save Burholme Park, SAVE BURHOLME PARK, http://saveburholmepark.org 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (noting the importance of Burholme Park to the surrounding community). 
 5. See, e.g., Mary Turnipseed et al., Legal Bedrock for Rebuilding America’s Ocean Ecosystems, 
324 SCI. 183, 183–84 (2009); Rafe Sagarin & Mary Turnipseed, The Gulf oil Disaster and the Public Trust 
Doctrine, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, June 11, 2010, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010 
/06/11/95601/commentary-the-gulf-oil-disaster.html. 
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residents to preserve the park.6 Historically, the public trust doctrine has 
played an important role in deterring inappropriate exploitation of public 
resources by governmental bodies and private parties. By legalizing the 
public property status of certain resources that are critical for the common 
good of society,7 the doctrine prohibits both state and private actions that 
would harm public interests in these resources. 
 Joseph Sax, the pioneering figure in the public trust doctrine movement, 
once boldly stated that “[o]f all the concepts known to American law, only the 
public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which 
might make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”8 
Indeed, the public trust doctrine played an important part in kindling the 
environmental movement in the early 1970s.9 The past few decades also 
witnessed an increasingly broad expansion of the doctrine by courts. 
Originally focused on protecting resources for navigation, commerce, and 
fishing, the public trust doctrine has evolved into a legal tool for ecological 
preservation and recreational use of certain public resources.10  
 In academia, there has been a mushrooming of proposals to address 
critical social problems in allocating and managing human resources, ranging 
from cultural heritage,11 to the radio spectrum,12 to intellectual property.13 
                                                                                                                  
 6. Applying the public trust doctrine, the Commonwealth Court in Pennsylvania rejected the City 
of Philadelphia’s decision to lease the Burholme Park to the Fox Chase Cancer Center. See Press Release, 
SCRUB, Victory in the Courts: Public Trust Doctrine Prevents Lease of Parkland (Dec. 9, 2008), available 
at http://www.defenseofplace.org/burholme.pdf. The court’s ruling was largely based on the public trust 
doctrine. Id. 
 7. Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351 
(1998) (pointing out that the public trust doctrine promotes the human values of “guardianship, 
responsibility, and community”); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 315 (1980) (“The public trust doctrine is rooted in the precept that some resources 
are so central to the well-being of the community that they must be protected by distinctive, judge-made 
principles.”). 
 8. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970). 
 9. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Consultants' Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2059–60 
(2008) (book review) (discussing the role of the public trust doctrine in environmental movement); Erin 
Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural 
Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 479–80 (2001) (“Environmental activists widely hailed the 
emergence of the new public trust as the legal tool that would finally empower them against powerful 
private and government interests they believed imperiled natural resources nationwide.”).  
 10. ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, RESTORING THE 
TRUST: WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES, WHITE PAPER 
NO. 908, at 4–5 (2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Public_Trust_Doctrine_Manual.pdf 
(“From its historical roots in navigation, fishing, and commerce, the doctrine has evolved to encompass modern 
public uses that include recreation and aesthetic uses and environmental preservation.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: 
Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1119–20 (2005) (proposing that 
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Recently, the Colorado state legislature considered whether their state 
constitution should be amended to include the public trust doctrine.14 At the 
global level, there are calls for a blue covenant among nations to redefine the 
world’s fresh water as a public trust resource rather than a commercial 
product.15 
 While the public trust doctrine has played an increasingly important role 
in protecting natural resources and the public interest, it has also attracted 
scathing criticisms of the theoretical foundation of the doctrine and its 
concomitant expansive scope of application. Criticisms have been leveled 
against its counter-majoritarian16 pedigree in our democratic system,17 its lack 
                                                                                                                  
“the public trust doctrine may support the right of citizens (including American Indian citizens) to use 
public lands for religious and cultural purposes, and it explores the accompanying federal duty to 
facilitate such uses”); Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: 
Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 195 (2001) (arguing that 
“[t]he public trust doctrine . . . could be extended to safeguard art objects that are subjected to extensive 
public use”). Similar public interest-based models could be found in the other two works. See Kristen 
Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1029 (2009) (employing a public interest-
based model to sites of cultural significance); see also JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A 
REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999). 
 12. See, e.g., Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of 
Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
285, 287 (2004) (arguing that the public trust doctrine should be applied to the electromagnetic spectra to 
promote fair and efficient use). 
 13. See Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in 
a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 647 (2000). 
 14. See INITIATIVE FOR ADOPTION OF THE COLORADO PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/LCS/Initiative%20Referendum/1112InitRefr.nsf/dac421ef79ad243487256def006
7c1de/d342a9d87efbc57c87257719004fc379/$FILE/2011-2012%20%233.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
 15. See MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING 
BATTLE FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER (2008) (arguing that the world’s fresh water supply should be held in the 
public trust); Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to 
International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291, 291–92 (1976) (advocating the 
establishment of an international public trust doctrine through an international convention). 
 16. The term was coined by Alexander Bickel. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (Josephine Ann Bickel, 
2d ed. 1986) (1962) (arguing that judicial review is illegitimate because it allows unelected judges to 
strike down the laws made by elected representatives and that judicial review by nature undermines 
the will of the majority of people). 
 17. Some critics argued that expansive use of the public trust doctrine would unreasonably 
interfere with private property rights and result in judicial supremacy. See James L. Huffman, A Fish Out 
of Water: The Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 567 (1988) [hereinafter 
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water]; James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 2 (2007) (explaining the misunderstood history 
behind the public trust doctrine); Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine: A Warning to 
Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1998); George P. Smith II & Michael 
W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 322–41 (2006). 
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of flexibility in accommodating administrative expertise in managing natural 
resources,18 and its hostility toward private property protection.19  
 Despite the rapid development in application of the public trust 
doctrine, the conventional wisdom about the theoretical foundation of the 
doctrine, this Article shows, has failed to render a solid response to waves of 
criticisms leveled against it.20 Joseph Sax, the pioneering figure in the public 
trust doctrine movement, and his fellow advocates have clung to the view 
that the doctrine is tied to the necessity of using judicial supervision of the 
governmental management of resources held in trust for the public. To them, 
the doctrine essentially recognizes and enforces a common law right of the 
public to certain natural resources. These ideas are admirable. However, 
there are defects inherent in them. Their focus on the judicial role in 
protecting the public interest not only fails to respond to the criticisms, but 
also neglects a more dynamic understanding of the social–political 
foundation of the public trust doctrine.  
 Against this backdrop, this Article argues that it is high time for us to 
revisit the theoretical foundation of the public trust doctrine. Drawing on the 
lessons from centuries of invoking the public trust doctrine to address a host 
of social problems, this Article puts forward a new social–political theory of 
the doctrine based on the role of public space in forming the basic human 
condition. Moreover, it discusses how a new model of the doctrine can work 
to further our collective interest in maintaining and enhancing the vitality of 
the social environment for human development. 
 This Article points out that it is narrow-minded to shape the public trust 
doctrine as a legal tool centered on the judiciary and judge-made rules in 
protecting the public interest. It argues that under the new social–political 
theory I propose, the doctrine should rather be recognized as a legal tool to 
enforce the public trust principle, a principle that is fundamental to our legal 
system in general and the constitutional protection of rights in particular. 
The public trust principle, by nature, affords citizens with fundamental 
                                                                                                                  
 18. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633 (1986) (arguing that 
continued judicial reliance on the public trust doctrine may stifle the evolution of modern environmental 
law and regulation). 
 19. RANDY T. SIMMONS, PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PERC POLICY SERIES-
39 (Apr. 2007), www.perc.org/pdf/ps39.pdf (discussing the potential threat the public trust doctrine poses 
to private property rights); Stephanie Reckord, Limiting the Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine in 
New Jersey: A Way to Protect and Preserve the Rights of Private Ownership, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 
249, 272–74 (2005) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s expansion of public trust rights to the 
dry sand areas of beaches to accommodate recreational use by the public); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (1990) (arguing that judicial changes in the law impacting 
private property rights should not be immune from a takings analysis). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 62–67. 
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rights over the public space that is indispensable for human development. 
The protection of the public interest under this principle embodies the 
fundamental human value of protecting public space and underscores the 
need for the legal system to be shaped in a manner that effectuates this 
human value. 
 Furthermore, the new social–political theory of the public trust doctrine 
that I propose goes beyond the conventional wisdom on the public trust 
doctrine along other fronts as well. First, it redefines the nature of the public 
rights protected by the public trust doctrine and enforced largely by judicial 
decisions. This Article argues that they should be recognized as citizens’ 
fundamental rights that deserve constitutional protection. Second, it 
contends the public trust doctrine carries more than rights-conferring 
functions; it also imposes social responsibilities on the government, courts, 
and individuals as members of the public for the purpose of protecting 
public space. Through the enforcement of social responsibilities, the 
doctrine promotes a stewardship ethic for protecting public space. Third, this 
Article alters the conventional trusteeship model under the public trust 
doctrine, which deems the government to be the sole trustee responsible for 
managing public resources. It demonstrates that the social responsibility 
model of stewardship requires not only the government, but also the 
judiciary, and even individuals as members of the public, to be the stewards 
of public resources. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the development of the 
public trust doctrine in American law and discusses the nature of the 
controversies about the doctrine. Part II puts forward a new social–political 
theory of the doctrine by examining the role of public space in human 
development. Based on the new theory, it further considers the doctrine’s 
rights-conferring functions. Part III argues that the public trust doctrine also 
imposes social responsibilities on the government, the judiciary, and 
individuals as members of the public. In this sense, the doctrine is a legal 
tool that embodies both rights-conferring and responsibilities-imposing 
functions. Part IV considers how the proposals made in the earlier two Parts 
can respond to the criticisms that have been leveled against the public trust 
doctrine. 
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I. THE UNEASY CASE FOR THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. The Historical Trajectory of the Public Trust Doctrine 
1. Roots in the European Civil and Common Laws 
 The public trust doctrine has a venerable history. It is widely accepted 
that the doctrine stemmed from Roman law concepts of public property, 
which prescribed that the air, rivers, sea, and seashore were not subject to 
private ownership by individuals. Rather, they were dedicated to the use by 
the public. For example, the Institutes of Justinian states: 
 
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the 
air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. 
No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided 
that he respects habitations, monuments, and buildings which are 
not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations.21 
 
 With the rise of free trade in Europe, the idea of the public trust was 
invoked by those who opposed the kings’ and the feudal lords’ exclusive 
control of certain natural resources essential to the manufacture and trade of 
products in the marketplace. Thus, the Roman law idea of public trust 
gradually took root in many common law and civil law jurisdictions in 
Europe. In England, thanks to the Magna Carta, the public trust doctrine was 
included as part of English common law in order to restrict the Crown’s 
proprietary control over certain natural resources. It was mandated that the 
Crown’s title to resources such as waterways and the foreshore was subject 
to the people’s “common right to use these public trust lands and their 
resources for certain traditional purposes necessary to individual survival 
and livelihood, including navigation, commerce and fishing.”22 
                                                                                                                  
 21. J. INST.2.1.1 (J. Thomas trans. 1975).  
 22. Megan Higgins, Public Access to the Shore: Public Rights and Private Property, in 
AMERICA’S CHANGING COASTS 183, 184 (Diana M. Whitelaw & Gerald R. Visgilio eds., 2005). See also 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and 
arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high 
water mark, within the jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King. Such 
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide 
is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and 
improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for 
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 In thirteenth-century Spain, public rights in navigable waterways were 
recognized in Spanish law.23 By the eleventh century a French law had been 
decreed that provided that “the public highways and byways, running water 
and springs, meadows, pastures, forests, heaths and rocks . . . are not to be 
held by lords[;] . . . nor are they to be maintained . . . in any other way than 
that their people may always be able to use them.”24 The French Civil Code 
later “perpetuated the notion of common property with respect to navigable 
rivers and streams, beaches, ports and harbours.”25  
2. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois and Its Progeny 
 Since England, France, and Spain colonized many parts of North 
America, the colonial period saw the first migration of the public trust 
doctrine into American law. In the 1840s, the idea of “public trust” emerged 
in Martin v. Waddell,26 in which the Supreme Court ruled that “the shores, 
and rivers, and bays, and arms of the sea, and the land under them . . . [were] 
held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely 
used by all for navigation and fishery.”27 
 American law fully adopted the public trust doctrine after Illinois 
Central Railroad v. Illinois,28 a Supreme Court decision of 1892 that is 
recognized as the “lodestar” of the modern public trust doctrine.29 The case 
concerned a land grant from the Illinois state legislature to the Illinois 
Central Railroad Company, which covered the Chicago lakeshore with 1,000 
acres of submerged lands. In its decision, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
initial grant of the lands based on the public trust doctrine. The Court ruled 
                                                                                                                  
highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose 
of fishing by all the King's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, 
as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the 
dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the nation 
and for the public benefit. 
Id. 
 23. See LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 821 (Robert I. Burns ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2001) (n.d.) (“Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common . . . .”). 
 24. MARC BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (Janet Sondheimer trans., 1966) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Ralph Pentland, Public Trust Doctrine–Potential in Canadian Water and Environmental 
Management, POLIS PROJECT ON ECOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE, POLIS DISCUSSION PAPER 1, 3 (June 2009), 
http://www.flowforwater.org/documents/public_trust_doctrine.pdf. 
 26. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).  
 27. Id. at 413.  
 28. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 29. Sax, supra note 8, at 489; see also Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public 
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 452 
(1989) (discussing the role of Illinois Central in the development of public trust doctrine in the United 
States). 
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that the lands concerned were “held in trust for the people of [Illinois],” and 
that the public “may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties.”30 The Court further held that the grant of 
public land had resulted in “substantial impairment of the public interest” by 
excluding the public at large from having free and unimpeded access to, and 
use of, the land.31 
 Following Illinois Central, courts often invoked the public trust 
doctrine to keep natural resources, such as waterways, available to the public 
for economic activities including navigation, commerce, and fishing. The 
post-Illinois Central decisions, therefore, were largely geared toward the 
need to promote economic development in different regions of America. 32 
3. The New Vision of the Doctrine 
 Joseph Sax’s 1970 Michigan Law Review article marked a paradigm 
shift in the public trust doctrine from its economic development-centric 
mode. With the rise of the modern environmental movement in the 1960s, 
Sax revitalized the public trust doctrine by unleashing its potential for 
protecting natural resources. In doing so, he imbued the public trust doctrine 
with new elements of substantive and procedural underpinnings.  
 In terms of the substantive value, Sax argued that the public trust doctrine 
should not be restricted to its conventional role in protecting the right of 
navigation, commerce, and fishing. Rather, the doctrine could act as a 
powerful legal tool for people to protect their right to sustainable protection of 
the environment.33 He proposed that the public right to preservation of certain 
natural resources should be protected by the doctrine in the following three 
ways: first, “that certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen 
that their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather 
than of serfs;”34 second, “that certain interests are so particularly the gifts of 
nature’s bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the 
                                                                                                                  
 30. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452. 
 31. Id. at 453. 
 32. See Molly Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789–
1920, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1403, 1404–05 (1980) (noting that “the public trust doctrine evolved as one of 
the most durahle [sic] tools for state intervention in and regulation of economic growth” in the post-
Illinois Central era). 
 33. See Sax, supra note 8, at 478–89. See also JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: 
A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 158–74 (1971). 
 34. Sax, supra note 8, at 484. 
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populace;”35 and finally, “that certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that 
makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate.”36 
 With regard to the procedural value, Sax proposed that the public trust 
doctrine should be used to combat problems in the management of certain 
natural resources by the government. He discovered that the governmental 
management of natural resources is vulnerable to lobbying efforts made by 
interest groups. Thus, the decisions made by government can be skewed by 
the lobbying efforts, leading to harm to the public interest. To correct this 
problem, Sax contended that the public trust doctrine should procedurally 
empower courts to act on citizens’ behalf to override any unreasonable 
privatization of natural resources carried out by government.37  
 In order to fulfill its substantive and procedural promises, the modern 
public trust doctrine, according to Sax, must be imbued with three interrelated 
standards of review: (1) “contain[ing] some concept of a legal right in the 
general public,” (2) “be[ing] enforceable against the government,” and (3) 
“be[ing] capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns 
for environmental quality.”38 With the surge of the environmental movement, 
Sax’s theory of the public trust doctrine has provided a legal cause of action 
for public interest activists and citizens at large to prevent or stop 
environmental harm caused to certain natural resources. Inspired by Sax’s 
groundbreaking thoughts, many courts relied on the public trust doctrine to 
defend the public interest in the preservation and protection of natural 
resources. 
4. Expansive Application of the Doctrine through Statutorization and 
Judicial Decisions 
 As shown above, before the rise of the environmental movement in the 
early 1970s, the public trust doctrine was largely used to protect the public 
interest in the utilitarian functions of natural resources for economic 
development. The application of the doctrine focused on ensuring public 
access to natural resources for navigation, commerce, or fishing, which were 
indispensable for economic activities. In accordance with these utilitarian 
functions, the resources held under public trust generally include navigable 
waters and land submerged under water. 
 With the rise of the environmental movement and the growing influence 
of Joseph Sax’s pioneering visions, court decisions gradually transformed the 
                                                                                                                  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 485. 
 37. Id. at 495–96. 
 38. Id. at 474. 
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doctrine into a legal tool that broadly protects the public interest in the 
ecological and recreational functions of public resources. For example, the 
doctrine has been expanded to support the claims for preserving water 
resources,39 forests,40 and wildlife.41 Courts ruled in many cases that the 
residents’ access to and recreational use of public parks must be ensured under 
the doctrine.42 The protected recreational uses also include public access to the 
beachfront for activities such as swimming, surfing, and sunbathing. 
 Meanwhile, the legal status of the public trust doctrine has been formally 
recognized in many state constitutions and both federal and state 
environmental statutes.43 For example, in honor of the nation's first celebration 
of International Earth Day, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted section 27 of 
their constitution, which provides that “public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As 
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain 
                                                                                                                  
 39. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); 
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000). 
 40. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 41. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526–29 (1896) (tracing the common law roots 
and modern evolution of the soverign “right . . . to control and regulate the common property in game” 
under “a trust for the benefit of the people”); see also Blake Hudson, The Public and Wildlife Trust 
Doctrines and the Untold Story of the Lucas Remand, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99 (2009) (highlighting 
how the public trust doctrine can be used against takings challenges); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a 
Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 724 
(1989) (arguing that the public trust doctrine should be expanded to include wildlife and its habitat). 
 42. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970) (holding that the 
public trust doctrine prevents the sale of a park); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 
N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (holding construction of water treatment plant in a city park required 
state legislative approval). See also Karl P. Baker & Dwight H. Merriam, Indelible Public Interests in 
Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275, 285–90 (2005) 
(employing a comparative analysis to better understand the relationship between government and the 
“unorganized public” with respect to publically-owned property); Mackenzie Keith, Judicial Protection 
for Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust Doctrine Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 165, 168 (2010) (arguing “courts can protect public recreational interests by ensuring 
public access to upland beaches and by preventing government management decisions that curtail the 
public’s recreational use of upland parklands”); Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: 
Can Public Parks Be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23, 34–35 (2002) 
(arguing that public parks should be protected under the public trust doctrine). 
 43. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and 
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 714 (2006) (“The environmental movement of the 
1970s and Sax's article led not only to a resurgence in use of the common law public trust doctrine to 
protect natural resources and the environment but also to efforts to amend state constitutions to codify the 
public trust doctrine or create new constitutional rights to a clean or healthful environment.”); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive 
Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 863, 864 (1996) (cataloging various forms of public trust-like protections in 
state constitutions). See also Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 
DUKE L.J. 1169 (1997) (discussing the adoption of constitutional and statutory provisions in various 
states). 
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them for the benefit of all the people.”44 Other states paralleled Pennsylvania’s 
course, enshrining various forms of the public trust idea in their constitutions. 
For example, Montana’s constitution, approved in 1972, moves this agenda 
even further. It provides an “inalienable right[]” to a “clean and healthful 
environment”45 and creates a duty upon both the state and private persons to 
“maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for 
present and future generations.”46 The same provision goes on to require that 
the legislature “provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty” 
and “provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life 
support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent 
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”47 
 Moreover, a variety of state and federal environmental statutes have 
embraced the idea of public trust as the foundation of their legislative purpose 
and principle. This is probably the most important achievement of the 
environmental movement, because these statutes set up a comprehensive and 
detailed framework for environmental regulation. For instance, the 
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act, passed in 1971, includes a 
declaration of policy that “the air, water and other natural resources of the 
state of Connecticut” are held in public trust.48 In New York, General City 
Law provides that “[t]he rights of the city in and to its water front, ferries, 
wharf property, bridges, land under water, public landings, wharves, docks, 
streets, avenues, highways, parks, waters, waterways and all other public 
places are hereby declared to be inalienable[.]”49 
 At the federal level, comprehensive federal environmental statutes and 
the agencies to implement them through regulation and enforcement have 
been created gradually. Many of these statutes, particularly the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered 
Species Act, are based on public trust doctrine. This is because these federal 
statutes set out a policy of protecting and preserving the environment for 
both the current and future generations. 
                                                                                                                  
 44. PA. CONST. art I., § 27. 
 45. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 46. Id. at art. IX, § 1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 22a-15 (1971). The declaration of policy states: “It is hereby 
found and declared that there is a public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state of 
Connecticut and that each person is entitled to the protection, preservation and enhancement of the same. 
It is further found and declared that it is in the public interest to provide all persons with an adequate 
remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution, impairment or 
destruction.” Id.. 
 49. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 15, § 383 (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter 
/downloads/pdf/citycharter2004.pdf. 
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B. The Great Debate about the Public Trust Doctrine 
 While the public trust doctrine has evolved into an important tool for 
protecting public resources, its foray into ecological preservation and 
recreational uses has turned out to be controversial on multiple fronts of the 
law and policy debate. Kearney and Merrill encapsulate the controversies 
that surround the public trust doctrine as follows: 
 
The public trust doctrine has always been controversial. The 
general rule in American law favors ownership of natural 
resources as private property. The public trust doctrine, a jarring 
exception of uncertain dimensions, posits that some resources are 
subject to a perpetual trust that forecloses private exclusion rights. 
For environmentalists and preservationists who view private 
ownership as a source of the degradation of our natural and 
historical resources, the public trust doctrine holds out the hope of 
salvation through what amounts to a judicially enforced 
inalienability rule that locks resources into public ownership. For 
those who view private property as the bulwark of the free 
enterprise system and constitutional liberty, the doctrine looms as 
a vague threat.50 
 
 At the heart of the hostility toward the public trust doctrine, as Kearney 
and Merrill indicate, lies a central critique that sees the idea of public trust as 
inherently threatening to the stability of the private property-based 
democracy that is the foundation of individual liberty and security. From 
this perspective, opponents attacked the doctrine based on Sax’s ideas 
primarily in two ways. First, the public trust doctrine is, by nature, a 
judicially-created and enforced tool that empowers the judiciary to threaten, 
disrupt, and even overturn legislative and administrative decisions to 
regulate public resources and protect private property. Led by Professor 
James Huffman, a long-time critic of the doctrine, commentators asserted 
that “the doctrine often permits nondemocratic courts to overrule the 
decisions of theoretically democratic legislatures. Thus, Sax’s argument fails 
to justify the public trust doctrine in the context of American constitutional 
democracy.”51 
 Second, opponents argued that the public trust doctrine enables 
judicially-backed state actions that seize private property without 
                                                                                                                  
 50. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 51. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water, supra note 17, at 565. 
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compensation. This runs directly counter to the Fifth Amendment, which 
clearly prohibits abuse of this governmental power. McQueen v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council52 illustrates the power of the public trust doctrine 
in defeating the Fifth Amendment claims. In that decision, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that no unconstitutional taking occurred when 
the state Coastal Council denied a permit application from McQueen to 
build a bulkhead and fill tidelands on what had earlier been his two 
residential lots. According to the court’s ruling, the public trust doctrine 
places “a restriction on McQueen’s property rights inherent in the ownership 
of property bordering tidal water.”53 Such increased use of the public trust 
doctrine as a principle against the invocation of the Fifth Amendment caused 
an angry outcry.54 Opponents claimed that “private property rights are either 
compromised or eliminated altogether without any Fifth Amendment 
compensation.”55 More broadly, the weakening of the Fifth Amendment 
gave rise to the concern that the public trust doctrine would seriously 
undermine private property protection in the long run. Thus, commentators 
contended that “any expansion of the public trust doctrine will narrow the 
remaining scope of private property and transfer more power to 
government.” 56 
 Apart from the private property-based critiques of the doctrine’s 
antidemocratic pedigree, opponents also discredit the doctrine as a narrow-
minded and obsolete vehicle for environmental protection. To them, the 
variegated web of legislative and administrative efforts have already created 
a comprehensive and advanced regulatory system to protect the 
environment. This system has demonstrated increasing sensitivity to, and 
capability in, environmental concerns and problems. By contrast, the 
judiciary lacks the necessary expertise to address the environmental 
problems that have become increasingly complex. Therefore, judge-made 
law and decisions will not be able to manage the systematic protection of the 
environment. Heavy reliance on the public trust doctrine, commentators 
                                                                                                                  
 52. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003). 
 53. Id. at 120.  
 54. Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, 1 at *27–38 (R.I. Super. Ct., 
2005) (public trust doctrine can block a tidelands development without compensation); see also Michael 
C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical 
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005); Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the 
Property Owner’s Reasonable Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina Marsh Island Bridge 
Debate, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 121, 146 (2006). 
 55. Smith & Sweeney, supra note 17, at 333. See also Huffman, A Fish Out of Water, supra 
note 17, at 528 (arguing that “much of modern public trust law infringes upon vested private property 
rights and is therefore violative of the federal constitution”); James L. Huffman, Background Principles 
and the Rule of Law, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27 (2008). 
 56. SIMMONS, supra note 19, at 17. 
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warned, would even yield more undesirable results and social conflict, in 
that its outdated visions make the doctrine itself more vulnerable to the 
private property-based critiques: 
 
Continued use of the doctrine ultimately threatens to impede 
environmental protection and resource conversation goals and 
possibly render Pyrrhic earlier advances. Most fundamentally, the 
doctrine’s operation exacerbates a growing clash in liberal 
ideology within natural resources law—between the need for 
individual autonomy and security, traditionally tied up in private 
property rights, and the demands of longer-term collectivist goals 
expressed in environmental protection and resource conservation 
laws.57 
 
 Central to the attacks on the public trust doctrine are doubts about the 
flexible, ad hoc approach that the doctrine embraces to address complex 
social issues of resource protection and preservation. The first type of 
criticism, as shown above, is based on an ideology that gives primacy to 
private property protection. The second type of criticism targets the 
perceived lack of judicial expertise to address increasingly complex 
environmental problems.  Both types of attacks, however, come together to 
exhibit a strong distrust of decisions made by judges in a case-by-case and 
piecemeal manner. The judicially-centered approach, in the critics’ view, 
lacks adequate predictability and stability in protecting both private property 
and public resources. 
 Despite the waves of attacks on the public trust doctrine from various 
fronts, the doctrine itself has been active and effective in fulfilling its 
underlying promises and goals of defending public resources. A search in 
the LexisNexis database in August 2010 showed that there were about 720 
federal and state cases that dealt with the public trust doctrine. The latest 
Supreme Court decision on the doctrine is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi,58 which was decided in 1988. The latest federal circuit court 
decisions are Stockton East Water District v. United States59 and Abbey Co., 
LLC v. Lexington Insurance Co.,60 which were decided in 2009 and 2008 
respectively. Therefore, the doctrine has been actively used by both the 
federal and state courts. Moreover, there still remains a strong tendency to 
broadly apply the doctrine to defend the public trust resources for the 
                                                                                                                  
 57. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 692. 
 58. Phillips Petroleum  Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 59. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 60. Abbey Co., LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 289 F. App’x. 161 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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purpose of environmental protection, recreational use, and political 
engagement. In academia, there have been more proposals to use the 
doctrine to address other social issues such as cultural heritage preservation, 
the radio spectrum, intellectual property, and so on.61 
 These success stories raise the question as to why there has been a 
continued expansive use of the public trust doctrine on various fronts in 
spite of the waves of attacks that have been launched against it. The merits 
of any legal rules or standards, after all, largely rely on the extent to which 
they are capable of responding to their critics by demonstrating how they 
can ward off the undesirable social outcomes that the critics predict. It is 
through responding to criticisms that our legal rules or standards become 
more theoretically convincing and practically workable. 
 While the courts’ decisions and the realities of environmental protection 
have shown the success of the public trust doctrine, the proponents of the 
doctrine have not yet come up with a comprehensive and systematic 
response to the attacks on the doctrine. Sax, the founder of the modern 
theory of the public trust doctrine, has not yet taken the lead to do so. The 
core idea of the public trust doctrine still remains the judicial intervention 
model. As Sax proposed in 1970, “[w]hen a state holds a resource which is 
available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with 
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated 
either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public 
uses to the self-interest of private parties.”62 His subsequent works calling 
for expansive use of the public trust doctrine have generally repeated his 
pioneering article by making the judiciary the center of the doctrine. For 
example, in his call to liberate the public trust doctrine from its “[h]istorical 
[s]hackles,” Sax still emphasized the role of the judiciary as the central 
power in moving the environmental movement forward.63  
 Meanwhile, Sax’s followers who have defended the doctrine still 
present it as a tool for judicial intervention in governmental decisions 
regarding management of public trust resources.64 For instance, by drawing 
on the process theory of judicial review,65 William Araiza argued that the 
                                                                                                                  
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 11–13. 
 62. Sax, supra note 8, at 490 (emphasis omitted). 
 63. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 185, 193–94 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine]. 
 64. See, e.g., David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial 
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 
368–70 (1988) (discussing the judicial intervention aspect of the public trust doctrine in the context of 
Illinois Central, among other perspectives); Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 277 (examining the potential role 
for the public trust doctrine in judicial review of public land management decisions). 
 65. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100–01 
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invocation of the public trust doctrine should be seen as the “Court’s attempt 
to find a role for judicial review within a democracy by focusing on the 
clearing of channels by which citizens exercise political power.”66 
 Yet the central problem in the judicial intervention model as 
championed by Sax and his followers is that it indeed invites skepticism 
about judiciary supremacy in protecting the public resources and the 
attendant risk of jeopardizing private property. Critics have been 
bombarding the expanding application of the doctrine with questions such 
as: Why are the courts empowered to be the leading force to protect public 
resources? Why can’t we let the democratically formed legislatures or 
administrative agencies play the central role in tackling the myriad of issues 
concerned with environmental protection? What is the relationship between 
private property and public interests in public resources? Could the public 
interests necessarily gain primacy over private property? Therefore, for the 
proponents of the doctrine, substantial questions still loom large and the 
substantive values of the doctrine still await exploration. No wonder 
commentators claim that the public trust doctrine is little more than a 
“simple, easily understood, and intuitively appealing approach to 
environmental protection.”67 To respond to the attacks, we need to respond 
to questions such as: What are the fundamental values that undergird the 
public trust doctrine and how can we achieve them in practice? Moreover, if 
there are any fundamental values, would they necessarily lend support to a 
public trust regime that is centered on judicial intervention? 
 In the following two parts of this Article, I will argue that we can make 
a comprehensive and systematic response to criticisms leveled against the 
public trust doctrine by revisiting the fundamental value that undergirds the 
doctrine. To this end, I will put forth that the fundamental value of the 
doctrine lies in its role of protecting a vibrant public space that is essential 
                                                                                                                  
(1980) (arguing that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting 
minority rights). For example, Ely points out that “[t]he Constitution has . . . proceeded from the . . . 
sensible assumption that an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights, and has 
sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself — by 
structuring decision processes at all levels to try to ensure, first, that everyone's interests will be actually 
or virtually represented (usually both) at the point of substantive decision, and second, that the processes 
of individual application will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of 
discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Id. 
 66. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based 
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 
45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 389 (1997). For a similar defense, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust 
Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction &. Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 51 (2006). 
 67. Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust 
Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1991). 
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for human development. It is the collective enterprise of maintaining and 
enhancing the robustness and vitality of public space that makes the public 
trust doctrine an indispensable legal tool for human flourishing and social 
development.  
 To be sure, I do not mean that Sax and his followers do not have any 
valid responses to the changes in the public trust doctrine and the ways it 
resurrected itself from the waves of attacks. Instead, I believe that they have 
not gone far enough to defend the doctrine.  
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLE OF PROTECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS OVER PUBLIC SPACE 
 In this Part, I will put forward a new social–political theory of the public 
trust doctrine that is capable of rendering a comprehensive and systematic 
response to the attacks against the doctrine. I will argue that we can 
reconceptualize the theoretical and policy foundation of the doctrine by 
considering the indispensable role of public space in human development. In 
my view, the public trust doctrine plays a critically important role in 
protecting the vitality of public space, which is core to human development. 
From this perspective, the doctrine is a solid legal mandate for protecting 
public space and promoting public freedom. Moreover, the expansive use of 
the public trust doctrine has reshaped the doctrine as a constitutional principle 
that undergirds the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights over public 
space. Working in this way further shapes the doctrine itself to fill a loophole 
in our Constitution, which has been largely designed to protect the private 
sphere as the foundation of citizens’ private rights. The new foundation of the 
doctrine, as I will show, not only helps the public trust protagonists to defend 
the desirability of the doctrine, but also affords us with a better-informed 
vision of the role of the doctrine in promoting individual, as well as social, 
well-being. 
A. The Role of Private and Public Space in Human Development  
 Having a private space is of essential importance for every human being 
to achieve self-development and to flourish. The private space that belongs 
exclusively to a particular person draws the boundaries of the sphere, such as 
walls, fences, and doors. In this way, it affords a bounded sphere in which we 
are left free to choose our own ways of satisfying our desires and inclinations 
without undesirable interventions from others. In our own private spaces we 
remain free to design the contents of private life as individuals. We cook, eat, 
and sleep. We enjoy happiness and peace with family members and friends. 
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We can even choose to live through loneliness or sorrow. Even Hegel, 
although he was a crucial figure in inspiring modern communitarianism, 
attached great importance to the role of private space in fostering individual 
self-consciousness, personality, and worldview, which are all vital to human 
development. Hence, he states that “[t]he person must give himself an external 
sphere of freedom in order to have being as Idea.”68 A more thorough 
pronouncement of the role of private spaces in human development can be 
found in Hannah Arendt’s works. As a legendary thinker on the human 
condition, she asserted that “to have no private place of one’s own (like a 
slave) meant to be no longer human.”69 
 Yet having private space is not the only condition by which we achieve 
self-development and flourishing. The human condition, in fact, constantly 
entails direct or indirect influences from others. For example, our ability to 
speak a language, one of the basic human capabilities, is acquired through 
numerous encounters and interactions with others. Although parents surely 
play an important role in nurturing our linguistic capabilities in the family 
setting, we sustain and enhance them through speaking with and listening to 
people whom we meet on various occasions. Furthermore, our exposure to the 
general cultural environment improves our linguistic capabilities, because it 
provides us with the multitude of social norms that govern the ways in which 
people speak. These social norms are, by nature, collectively shaped by the 
people who live in the same community. Therefore, the role of “others” in 
human development, direct or indirect, shows that human action and speech, 
as Hannah Arendt observed, are “never possible in isolation” and “need the 
surrounding presence of others.”70 
 In addition to the “human” other, we also need non-human objects as the 
“other” for our development and flourishing. Things like houses, beds, and 
clothes form the external sphere that is essential to our life in our private 
space. Meanwhile, there are non-human objects that constitute the 
indispensable “other” outside the boundaries of private spaces. On the one 
hand, we can find our presence, be it constant or sporadic, in the non-human 
“other” that is not made by men. We go boating on the river, hiking in the 
                                                                                                                  
 68. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41, at 73 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. 
Nisbet trans., 1991). For interpretation of Hegel’s theory of property, see Haochen Sun, Designing Journeys to 
the Social World: Hegel’s Theory of Property and His Noble Dreams Revisited, 6 COSMOS & HIST.: J. NAT. & 
SOC. PHIL. 33, 33–34 (2010), available at http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal (Click “current 
issue” or “2010”). 
 69. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 64 (2d ed. 1998). See also Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (arguing that owning private property is 
essential for developing personhood). 
 70. ARENDT, supra note 69, at 188. Arendt also points out that “action and speech are 
surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men.” Id.  
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mountains, and picnicking in the forest. In our eyes, these things, the non-
man-made “other,” form the natural environment to which we belong.71 On 
the other hand, we can find our presence in the “other” that is made 
collectively by our fellow human beings. We speak loudly in the town square, 
drive freely on the highway, and play happily in the park. These venues, the 
man-made “other,” form the social environment in which we are nurtured. 
Whether man-made or not, all these “others” create the environment that lies 
outside the boundaries of our private spaces.72 
 This role of “others” in human development73 makes it impossible for any 
of us to live only within the closed boundaries of our own private spaces. 
Rather, because the “other” always physically exists outside of the private 
space, a person’s coming to the “other” requires him to situate himself in the 
place where he and the “other” can meet each other, though the distance 
between them is not constant (sometimes face-to-face, sometimes not). This 
arena is the public place where only open boundaries exist. 
 Basically, the openness of public space that accommodates “me” and 
“others” has two core attributes: publicity and commonality. First, public 
                                                                                                                  
 71. See FRANÇOIS LEYDET, THE LAST REDWOODS 132 (1969) (“[M]an does not live by bread 
alone. He has needs that are no less real and no less vital — although they are harder to measure in economic 
terms — than food and water and shelter. He has a thirst for beauty. He often has a hunger for solitude. He 
craves the companionship of other animal species. He has a deep, atavistic urge for identification with 
nature. Witness the extraordinary upsurge of hiking and camping and boating and the overwhelming increase 
in use of our natural parks.”); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 3 (2003) (“The stillness of a remote forest lake or the imposing crags of a mountain peak provide for 
many both a sense of connection to a larger world and a sense of inner wonder.”). 
 72. See GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF, & SOCIETY 135 (Charles W. Morris ed., University 
of Chicago Press, 15th impression, Phoenix Books 1967) (1934) (using the language process as an example 
to demonstrate that the self “arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the 
given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals”). 
 73. The phenomenologist account of human development offers the most profound discussion 
about the relationship between the self and the other. See, e.g., G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 
§ 178, at 11 (A. V. Miller trans., 1977) (“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact 
that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”); EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY 
AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 193 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Duquesne University Press 1969) 
(1961) (“It is the face; its revelation is speech. The relation with the Other alone introduces a dimension of 
transcendence, and leads us to a relation totally different from experience in the sensible sense of the term, 
relative and egoist.”). The idea of men as social beings further lends a strong support to the phenomenologist 
account of human development. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 12 (David Ross trans., Oxford 
University Press ed. 1980) (“[B]y self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient . . . for one who 
lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, 
since man is born for citizenship.”); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 10 (Oxford 1998); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA 
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 216 (1975) (“[L]ike everything else the self is defined by the totality of 
its relations with other beings and, particularly, with other selves.”); Karl Marx, Economic Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, in 66 THE MARX-ENGELS READER 85 (Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Nortan & 
Company 1978) (1844) (“[T]he human essence of nature first exists only for social man; for only here does 
nature exist for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for him—as 
the life-element of the human world. . . .”). 
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space is the open arena where “everything that appears in public can be seen 
and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity.”74 Once we 
enter into public spaces, it is inevitable that we expose ourselves to others 
though the means and degree of self-exposure are varied depending on 
circumstances. Our body movements, our voices, or even our thoughts are 
seen, heard, or learnt by the mass public. In public space, all our actions carry 
this sort of communicative function.75 
 Second, public space is the open arena where people have things together 
in common and these things are not held in exclusive possession by any single 
person.76 A public park, for example, is a place where all people, regardless of 
their income or residency in the country, can enter and enjoy its environment. 
This is because we treat the public park as a common resource and each of us 
is entitled to have access to and make use of it. More broadly, public space is 
the open arena where people map out their common goals and aspirations for 
a community, a country, or even the whole of humanity. In places such as 
streets, squares, and town halls, we hold discussions or debates about the 
issues associated with human interactions in society. Through interactions 
with one another, we gradually develop the common language we may use 
and the common identity that we choose to belong to. Therefore, public space 
affords us with the common sphere in which we can meet and act together to 
achieve social, cultural, or political agendas. 
 The attributes of both publicity and commonality clearly show that 
preserving the openness of public space is essential for developing the public 
freedom we must have for human development. Public freedom is concerned 
with the well-being of the people as a whole and the degree to which public 
space can contribute to it. Manipulation of any parts of public spaces dilutes 
its publicity and commonality. For example, the use of violence in or 
exclusive dominance over places like a public square is damaging to public 
freedom. Therefore, both private space and public space are essential for 
human development. While private space provides the necessary peace and 
security for an individual to achieve self-actualization and self-fulfillment, 
public space furnishes individuals with the indispensable vehicle for becoming 
members of a society and also provides a dynamic contextual environment for 
individuals to develop their individualities and personalities through their 
                                                                                                                  
 74. ARENDT, supra note 69, at 50. A similar notion of the publicity is offered by Iris Young. See 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 168–70 (2000). 
 75. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN 
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 27 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (noting that as 
performing of all communicative actions is done in a public setting, it necessarily involves “people’s public 
use of their reason”). 
 76. ARENDT, supra note 69, at 52. 
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private spaces. There is a cross-fertilizing and mutually interdependent 
relationship between the private and public spheres. Habermas captures the 
essence of the relationship by concluding that “[a] well-secured private 
autonomy helps ‘secure the conditions’ of public autonomy just as much 
as, conversely, the appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps ‘secure 
the conditions’ of private autonomy.”77 
B. The Asymmetry of Legal Protections of Private Spaces and Public Spaces 
 While the private sphere and public sphere are of equal significance for 
human development, our legal system, in particular the U.S. Constitution, 
provides relatively less protection for the human interest in public space. 
While the Constitution has been largely designed to afford strong protection of 
individuals’ rights over the private space, it does not contain direct provisions 
affording the public rights over public space. 
 Heavily influenced by liberalism and its prioritizing of individual liberty 
and freedom,78 the Constitution has been geared to safeguard the security and 
stability of the private space of individuals. To this end, it lays out the 
fundamental rights that individuals ought to enjoy and sets limits within which 
the government can exercise its power over these fundamental rights. 
 Constitutionally protected rights such as property rights79 and privacy 
rights80 all safeguard what a person decides to do in his or her private space in 
order to prevent or stop undesirable interference from others. Fundamental 
rights of this type empower persons to gain full control of their bodies and 
lives, and also enable them to design their individualities and plans to pursue 
lives of their own. From this perspective, other fundamental rights, including 
the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of 
association are largely extensions of what we do in our private spaces. They 
further reinforce our ability to decide what to do in our private spaces with the 
benefit of our experiences gained in exercising these rights. In fact, the need to 
protect individually-controlled private spaces with fundamental rights was 
clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
                                                                                                                  
 77. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 408 (1996) (internal citation omitted).  
 78. See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, Liberalism and the Constitution, 24 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 234, 
234 (2007) (“The U.S. Constitution is widely regarded as the preeminent historical expression of 
philosophical liberalism . . . .”). 
 79.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“Various guarantees [contained by the 
Constitution] create zones of privacy.”). 
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Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness.”81 
 To guarantee and reinforce the protection of fundamental rights, the 
Constitution itself carries a set of basic mandates that delimit the ways in 
which state institutions, namely the legislature and the executive branch, can 
exercise their power. These institutional designs ensure that each branch, 
which wield more resources than any individual, would not unduly intrude 
upon the private spaces that fundamental rights protect.82 
 Therefore, our Constitution is founded on the idea of protecting negative 
liberty, minimizing the government’s undue interference into the private space 
of individuals.83 The combination of fundamental individual rights and the 
power-limiting mandates for the government aims to ensure the safety and 
stability of the private space in which we are left to pursue our own private 
freedom for human development. In traditional political theory, this 
institutional arrangement is regarded as a safeguard of negative liberties 
against undesirable interferences by other individuals or the government 
against a particular individual’s exercise of freedom in his or her private 
space.84 
 As shown in the first section of this Part, public space plays an equally 
important role in human development as private space. Despite the paramount 
importance of public space, there are, however, no direct and explicit 
measures adopted in the Constitution to maintain and promote the public 
space over which individuals as citizens ought to have rights to promote 
human development. Nor does the Constitution explicitly protect or preserve 
the resources that form and enhance public space.  This gives rise to an 
inequality problem in the constitutional protection of human liberty: while 
                                                                                                                  
 81. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 82. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1 (1999) (“The Constitution is a governing document. It defines and 
constrains the way government operates and politics is conducted in the United States.”). 
 83. See David Abraham, Liberty without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a 
"Negative Citizenship" Regime, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 4 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. 
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1319 (1987) (“When we speak 
of constitutional protection for property rights, we think first of keeping, not having—of negative claims 
against interference with holdings, not positive claims to endowments or shares. Thus, we primarily 
understand property in its constitutional sense as an antiredistributive principle, opposed to governmental 
interventions into the extant regime of holdings for the sake of distributive ends.”); Harry N. Scheiber, 
Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 217, 218 (1984) 
(“Along with individual (personal) rights, such as those protected by the Bill of Rights, vested property 
rights were claims against government; they defined a zone of private action and uses of property into 
which governmental authority could not be allowed to penetrate.”). 
 84. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in  LIBERTY 166, 168–81 (2002) (explaining 
that negative liberty refers to the freedom without undue interference from the government, and positive 
liberty deals with the freedom derived from government plans and actions). 
2011] Public Trust Doctrine 587 
 
individuals’ negative liberties are protected as fundamental rights over private 
spaces, the Constitution does not explicitly protect individuals’ interests over 
public spaces, which are equally important for human development. 
 The lack of any provisions protecting the environment, in fact, epitomizes 
the absence of explicit protection of rights over public space in the 
Constitution. It is now widely accepted that maintaining a clean and healthy 
environment is fundamentally important to both the well-being of individuals 
and to the society as a whole. In an International Court of Justice ruling, Vice 
President Weeramantry asserted that “[t]he protection of the environment is 
likewise a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua 
non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life 
itself.”85 While environmental protection is of vital importance for our 
survival and future development, the Constitution contains no explicit 
provisions that either delegate power to the federal and state governments to 
adopt environmental regulatory measures or afford any fundamental 
environmental rights to citizens, despite three unsuccessful amendment 
attempts between 1967 and 1970, and renewed efforts in 2003.86 
 But if we look abroad, it is easy to find that the environmental right is 
enshrined as one of the fundamental rights in international human right 
treaties and in the constitutions of many countries.87 Without affording such a 
public right, our Constitution, according to commentators, “is one of the few 
such texts in the world that fails to explicitly address environmental 
protection.”88 
 Despite the structural asymmetry in the protection of rights in the United 
States, the constitutional protection of individual rights suggests that the law 
ought to recognize and defend interests that are fundamental to human 
development. The interest conception of rights has been systematized by 
Joseph Raz. He suggests that A has a right to X only if the interest A has in 
having X is a sufficient reason for imposing a duty on B; conceptions of 
interests are determined by ultimate values.89 Raz’s account thus allows for 
the derivation of both individual and collective rights from fundamental 
                                                                                                                  
 85. Concerning the Gabiçíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 85, 91 (Sept. 
25) (separate opinion of Vice President Weeramantry). 
 86. In 2003, Representative Jesse Jackson, Jr. introduced a constitutional amendment respecting 
“a right to a clean, safe, and sustainable environment.” H.R.J. Res. 33, 108th Cong. (2003). See also 
David W. Orr, Law of the Land, ORION, Jan.–Feb. 2004, available at http://www.orionmagazine.org/ 
index.php/articles/article/133/ (arguing for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing a right to a healthy 
environment). 
 87. See TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 27–28, 55–58 (2005) 
(examining the protection of environmental rights under international treaties and state constitutions). 
 88. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE 
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 229 (2010). 
 89. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 180 (1986). 
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interests. Individuals, he argues, have an interest in living in communities, and 
communities can have collective interests such as the interest in self-
determination.90 Therefore, following Raz’s interest theory of rights, as long 
as we have an interest in the public space that is strong enough, legal 
protection must be afforded to protect the rights concerned with public space. 
If individuals’ interests in private space can be protected as fundamental rights 
under the Constitution, individuals’ interests in public space also deserve 
protection as fundamental rights.91 
C. Public Trust Doctrine as a Legal Tool to Defend Public Space 
 Given the lack of explicit constitutional measures protecting individuals’ 
interests in public space, the public trust doctrine has largely been used to 
close this loophole in the Constitution. In doing so, the public trust doctrine 
has been designed as the linchpin for recognizing and protecting the public’s 
fundamental rights over public space. The doctrine performs this rights-
conferring function primarily by holding certain resources in trust for the 
general public as a whole and thereby making them open to all. These 
resources are by nature regarded as “inherent public property,”92 and every 
member of the public has free and unimpeded access and use of them. The 
public ownership vested in the general public makes the boundaries of the 
public trust resources constantly open to everyone on equal terms, preserving 
and enhancing their attributes of public access and commonality. Therefore, 
the public trust doctrine is by nature designed to keep the protected resources 
open to every member of the public and to prevent them from being privatized 
or monopolized, with closed boundaries, by any private parties.93 
 Since Illinois Central was decided in 1892,94 the public trust doctrine has 
conferred four kinds of fundamental rights upon individuals as members of 
the public. These rights are categorized as economic rights, ecological rights, 
cultural rights, and political rights. The fundamental rights protected by the 
public trust doctrine are reflective of individuals’ economic, ecological, 
                                                                                                                  
 90. Id. 
 91. Scheiber, supra note 83, at 219 (arguing that  “it is mistaken . . . to limit our understanding 
of rule of law in our constitutional and legal history so as to confine it altogether to notions of private 
claims against government”). 
 92. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986). 
 93. See id. at 774. Professor Rose pointed out that there are two essential elements in public 
property: “[F]irst, the property had to be physically capable of monopolization by private persons—or 
would have been without doctrines securing public access against such threats. Second, the public's claim 
had to be superior to that of the private owner, because the properties themselves were most valuable 
when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons—by the public at large.” Id. 
 94. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
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cultural, and political interests in using public spaces. Moreover, they are vital 
and crucial to economic, ecological, cultural, and political development of 
public space as a whole. 
1. The Right to Participate in Economic Activities in Public Space 
 Historically speaking, the first category of rights protected by the public 
trust doctrine involves participation in economic activities in public space. 
This includes the rights to commerce, navigation, and fishing. It has been 
recognized that some resources such as waterways are vital to the economic 
development of the nation and to individuals’ participation in economic 
activities such as transportation of raw materials and finished products. As 
Adam Smith pointed out, commerce requires the interaction of persons, and 
this requires access to certain physical locations, namely waterways and 
roads.95 Keeping public facilities such waterways, roads, and bridges open to 
the public is necessary for the transportation of goods and the movement of 
people involved in trade. 
 Dating back to the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court in Martin 
v. Waddell addressed the public trust doctrine and its application to coastal 
lands.96 In that case, the Court declared that “the shores, and rivers, and bays, 
and arms of the sea, and the land under them . . .  [were] held as a public trust 
for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation 
and fishery, as well as for shell-fish as floating fish.” 97 Later in Illinois 
Central, the Supreme Court drew on the collective-right approach to establish 
a new way of protecting the public interest in submerged lands, emphatically 
arguing as follows: 
 
[The title to submerged lands] is a title different in character from 
that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different 
from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which 
are open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the 
people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, 
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein 
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.98 
 
 Therefore, according to Illinois Central, the submerged lands underneath 
Lake Michigan could never be monopolized by a single private party. The 
                                                                                                                  
 95. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 17–19, 682 (Modern Library ed. 1937).  
 96. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
 97. Id. at 413. 
 98. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (emphasis added). 
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citizens’ fundamental rights should not and cannot be relinquished by 
conveying the lands to a private party. By maintaining the openness of the 
waterways and the land underneath, the Court protected citizens’ fundamental 
rights to participate in economic activities, allowing them to have equal access 
to and make unimpeded use of the public trust resources. 
2. The Right to Ecological Protection of Public Space 
 Given the paramount importance of ecosystem preservation, the public 
trust doctrine has been widely used to afford citizens with the right to 
ecological protection of public space.99 The protection of rights of this type 
reflects the fact that individuals share a common interest in maintaining a 
healthy natural environment for all.  
 It has been long recognized that the natural environment is formed by 
interconnected ecosystems, so that all the parts of the natural environment are 
interdependent and cannot be reduced to disparate bits and pieces.100 The 
deterioration of the environment usually results from human activities that 
make undesirable alterations to the integrity of the environment. These 
activities are routinely performed by people in order to exploit a particular 
natural resource without paying sufficient heed to the negative impacts on the 
environment in its entirety.  
 Against this backdrop, the public trust doctrine functions to protect and 
preserve the natural environment by providing safeguards against 
“destabilizing changes”101 to natural resources that belong to the public space 
of the general public. In doing so, the doctrine supports the “land ethic” that is 
based upon the notion that “[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
                                                                                                                  
 99. Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (quoting Marks 
v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)); Marks, 491 P.2d  at 380. Almost all commentators maintain that the 
public has the right to environmental protection under the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Sax, Liberating the 
Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 63, at 192–93 (discussing the public trust doctrine’s role in ecological 
protection given important property considerations such as expectations and destabilization); Bernard S. Cohen, 
The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388, 393–94 (1970) 
(arguing that the right to a healthy environment stems from the interaction of the public trust doctrine with the 
Ninth Amendment); David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of 
Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 712 (2008). 
 100. See, e.g., Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 875, 883 (1994) (“Our history . . . has taught us that activities in one part of the landscape greatly 
influence other parts.”). 
 101. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 63, at 188. (“The central idea of the 
public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without 
formal recognition such as title. The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such 
public expectations against destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional private property from 
such changes.”). 
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tends otherwise.”102 It also mandates that members of the public cannot use 
natural resources in a completely unencumbered fashion. Rather, 
“conservation of resources is intrinsically good and necessary for the 
continuance of society.”103 
 Therefore, the public trust has been invoked as a powerful legal tool for 
combating manipulative activities that damage the natural environment, 
including, among many others, water pollution104 and trafficking in 
endangered species.105 The typical case is the use of the doctrine to fight 
unreasonable diversion of natural resources. For example, the California 
Supreme Court forbade the water department of Los Angeles to unreasonably 
divert water from the rivers feeding Mono Lake on the ground that the vast 
diverting of water had severely degraded the lake’s scenic beauty and 
ecological values.106 Given that the lake waters are held in public trust for all 
the citizens in California, the State as the trustee of the water resources was 
deemed to have failed to “prevent[] any party from acquiring a vested right to 
appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public 
trust.”107 
 Moreover, by ruling out any unreasonable alterations to public trust 
natural resources, the doctrine recognizes and embraces the intrinsic values of 
maintaining the openness of the natural environment. The California Supreme 
Court, for example, emphasized the practice of conservation through keeping 
the tidelands open for all: 
 
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within 
the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those lands in their natural 
state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, 
as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat 
for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery 
and climate of the area.108 
                                                                                                                  
 102. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 240 (4th ed. 1975). 
 103. W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). 
 104. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 719; In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 
447 (Haw. 2000).  
 105. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
 106. Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714–16, 732. “As a result of these diversions, the level of the 
lake has dropped; the surface area has diminished by one-third; one of the two principal islands in the 
lake has become a peninsula, exposing the gull rookery there to coyotes and other predators and causing 
the gulls to abandon the former island.  The ultimate effect of continued diversions is a matter of intense 
dispute, but there seems little doubt that both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake 
are imperiled.” Id. at 711. 
 107. Id. at 727. 
 108. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (emphasis added). 
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This statement shows that the public trust doctrine fully recognizes 
interdependence of different elements of our natural environment. 
3. The Right to Cultural Participation in Public Space 
 Culture is a product of collective human efforts in creating the behavioral 
modes in a society.109 Any cultural development stems first from socialization 
in public space, through which human beings exchange ideas in a variety of 
ways. The recreational use of public space is an important vehicle for human 
socialization. A person’s participation in recreational activities in public space 
opens the door for him to mingle with others and to exchange thoughts and 
ideas with them. Moreover, it allows him to relax and improve his physical 
and mental well-being by taking part in those recreational activities with the 
company of other people in public space. 
 To enrich human socialization, the public trust doctrine has been 
designed to protect citizens’ rights to cultural participation in public space. 
The doctrine mandates that certain natural resources should be kept open for 
the public to use for recreational activities. The recreational uses permitted 
and protected by the doctrine include bathing, swimming, walking, and so 
on.110 By keeping certain natural resources open for recreational use by the 
public, the doctrine encourages people to enter public space, and thereby 
promotes cultural participation by facilitating active socialization among 
people in public space. The Connecticut Supreme Court first expressly 
recognized that public trust rights protect a variety of recreational activities, 
including “boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, gathering seaweed, 
cutting sedge, and . . . passing and repassing” in the public trust resources.111  
Generally speaking, there has been a solid recognition of the right of 
recreational use in many states, such as California,112 New Jersey,113 
Washington,114 and Michigan,115 with a few exceptions.116  
                                                                                                                  
 109. See, e.g., JERRY D. MOORE, VISIONS OF CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES AND THEORISTS 54 (2009) (“[C]ulture consisted of learned and shared 
knowledge and behavior, expressed in such different ways as technology, social organization, or 
language.”). 
 110. See generally Rose, supra note 92, at 777–81 (explaining the role of public property in 
facilitating socialization). 
 111. Town of Orange v. Resnick, 109 A. 864, 865 (Conn. 1920). 
 112. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 
719 (Cal. 1983). 
 113. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005); 
Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984). 
 114. Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). 
 115. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005).  
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 More importantly, the public trust doctrine carries a mandate to keep 
venues open to accommodate and facilitate recreational activities. By doing 
so, the doctrine keeps public spaces open for all and ensures that people are 
free to enter public spaces to interact and socialize with others. Under this 
doctrine, recreational uses of public venues, such as parklands, have been 
deemed crucial for the cultural development of human society.117 
4. The Right to Political Participation in Public Space 
 The public trust doctrine embraces a strong protection of citizens’ right to 
political participation in public space. Effective democratic governance 
necessarily entails citizens’ active participation in public discourse on a wide 
range of social issues. To this end, the citizens at large must have the freedom 
to take part in “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”118 debate in public space. 
By providing the venue for human interactions, the public trust doctrine 
fosters a culture of political participation, thus enriching human socialization 
and promoting democratic governance. 
 Under the public trust doctrine, public space ought to be kept open for 
everyone to express his or her views, to make suggestions, to exchange 
information, and to raise doubts. The openness of public space, in essence, 
allows people to speak freely in order to participate in democratic governance. 
For example, streets and parks are important venues for people to speak 
effectively in public space. Any interventions that limit the openness of streets 
and parks as public spaces would suppress free speech and impair the public’s 
right to participate in democratic governance. Hence, courts have invoked the 
public trust doctrine to make sure that streets and parks as the public fora for 
free speech activities are open to all. For example, in Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization, the Supreme Court famously stated  
 
[W]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and 
liberties of citizens.119 
                                                                                                                  
 116. The Massachusetts and Maine Supreme Courts refused to extend the public trust doctrine to 
recreational uses and strictly limited it to navigational and fishing purposes. See Opinion of the Justices, 
365 Mass. 681, 688 (1974); Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 516, 519 (Me. 1986). 
 117. See Baker & Merriam, supra note 42, at 299. 
 118. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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D. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Legal Tool to Enforce the Public Trust 
Principle 
 As shown above, the public trust doctrine confers rights on individuals 
with respect to their interests in public space. This represents an indirect 
approach to address the asymmetrical problem in the negative liberty-oriented 
Constitution: while individual rights over private spaces are enshrined as 
fundamental rights, the same does not apply to public rights over public 
spaces. 
 I will argue in this Part that the use of the public trust doctrine through 
judicial decisions, legislative actions, administrative measures, and even 
public discourse, has developed a general principle in our legal system and 
constitutional protection of rights. The public trust principle mandates that 
citizens’ fundamental rights over public space receive constitutional 
protection. Embodied in this mandate, the public trust principle is also one of 
the fundamental principles of the Constitution, along with separation of 
powers and the protection of human dignity. From this perspective, the public 
trust doctrine, in turn, should be understood as a legal tool to enforce the 
public trust principle. 
 No legal principle emerges in a vacuum. Legal history has repeatedly 
shown that the formation and maturation of a legal principle depends on 
whether it can capture fundamental human values and whether it can develop 
through cumulative social practice.120 The development of the constitutional 
public trust principle, as I will argue in the following sections, follows the 
trajectory of how legal principles become cornerstones of our legal system. 
1. The “We the People” Spirit 
 First of all, in protecting public space, the public trust principle embodies 
the “we the people” ethos, an idea that is fundamental to our Constitution. The 
Preamble of the Constitution states:  
 
WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.121  
                                                                                                                  
U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (“No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; 
all public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.”). 
 120. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 245–52 (1980). 
 121. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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The Constitution opens with a declaration that we can achieve these goals for 
all people. The “we the people” spirit lays the foundation for constitutional 
principles such as separation of powers and the protection of human dignity. 
These principles do not textually appear in the Constitution, but they are 
carved into the Constitution as fundamental principles that reflect basic human 
values and societal pursuits.  
 The idea of public trust embodies the “we the people” spirit with respect 
to the inalienable human interest in public space. Both private space and 
public space form the world in which we live. In contrast to the structure of 
private space, it is “we” not “me” that share the benefits derived from our 
involvement in public space and the costs of maintaining and improving 
public space. This ethos embedded in the public trust principle dates back to 
Arnold v. Mundy in 1821.122 In this case, a riparian landowner claimed private 
ownership of fishing rights because he claimed to have a grant to the bay. The 
court relied on “the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all the 
social rights,” and concluded that the idea of public trust was “nothing but a 
restoration of common law rights.”123 The court then held that the state cannot 
“make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the 
citizens of their common right,” adding that such a grant “never could be long 
borne by a free people.”124  
 Later, in Illinois Central, the Supreme Court ruled that it was the need to 
protect people’s rights to “enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein” that triggered the 
state’s obligation to manage these public spaces for the interests of the general 
public.125 In In re Complaint of Steuart Transportation Co., a federal district 
court stated that “[u]nder the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and 
the United States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the 
public’s interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from 
ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people.”126 
2. The Constitutional Practice 
 Embedded in the “we the people” spirit, the public trust principle has laid 
the foundation for some concrete mandates textually adopted or practically 
used in constitutional law. The practical use of these mandates, especially by 
                                                                                                                  
 122. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821). 
 123. Id. at 11–12. 
 124. Id. at 78. 
 125. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
 126. In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
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courts, shows the recognition of the importance of the public trust principle in 
constitutional law. 
 The public trust principle legitimizes the constitutional rules and 
doctrines that minimize governmental regulation of citizens’ activities in 
public space. The protection of free speech rights is designed in a manner to 
foster deregulation of public space by the government or at least to minimize 
the impact of governmental regulations on the people’s activities in public 
space. The public forum doctrine derived from the First Amendment prohibits 
unnecessary governmental regulation of speech activities carried out by 
people in public spaces. Under this doctrine, streets, parks, and sidewalks are 
designated as traditional public forums open to public discourse.127 The 
government may not close a traditional public forum to speech. To protect free 
speech rights, the public forum doctrine requires that when the government 
adopts content-based regulation of speech activities in a public forum, it must 
show that its action is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.128 If the 
restriction is content-neutral,129 the government action must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.”130 
 Despite the fact that the need for protecting public forums for speech is 
backed by the First Amendment, the public forum doctrine was first inspired 
and later supported by the public trust principle. Central to the public forum 
doctrine is the notion that resources used for speech must be held as public 
property for the general welfare of the people at large. The rise of the public 
forum doctrine in the early twentieth century clearly shows the influence of 
the public trust principle on its development.131 For example, in Members of 
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,132 Section 28.04 of the 
Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibited the posting of signs on public 
property. Justice Brennan suggested in his dissenting opinion that public 
property (such as utility poles in this case) is a “medium of communication 
[that] is particularly valuable in part because it entails a relatively small 
expense in reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating 
various formats, typographies, and graphics, and conveys its message in a 
                                                                                                                  
 127. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (adding that 
traditional public forums are “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 
assembly and debate”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Content-neutral regulations include limits on times (e.g., no amplified sound after 10 p.m.), 
places (e.g., protests only in designated portions of a public park), and manner (e.g., no fireworks) of 
speech activities.  
 130. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 131. See cases cited supra notes 118–19. 
 132. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
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manner that is easily read and understood by its reader or viewer.”133 
Therefore, utility poles must be held open as “an important medium of 
political expression.”134 Justice Brennan’s statement clearly shows that the 
foundation of the public forum doctrine lies in the public trust principle. As 
long as public property is needed for the public’s political communication and 
discourse, the government must hold that public property in trust for free 
speech purposes. 
 Hence, the practice of the public forum doctrine demonstrates the role of 
the public trust principle in undergirding and legitimizing constitutional 
measures that protect public space. As we have widely acknowledged that the 
protection of private property is a basic principle that animated the framing of 
the constitutional system, so too is the public trust principle. The protection of 
public property is indispensable to the framing of our constitutional system as 
well. According to Professor Rose, “there lies outside purely private property 
and government-controlled ‘public property’ a distinct class of ‘inherently 
public property’ which is fully controlled by neither government nor private 
agents.”135 The public trust principle comports with the reality of what 
sustains our human development: both private space/private property and 
public space/public property play an indispensable role. 
 Moreover, the rights conferred by the public trust principle are also 
compatible with the Ninth Amendment, which states that “[t]he enumeration 
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”136 The Ninth Amendment indicates 
that the Constitution provides a non-exhaustive list of fundamental rights that 
ought to be recognized as those belonging to citizens. It suggests that interests 
that are fundamental to human development deserve constitutional protection 
by the state and federal governments. This has been widely accepted as the 
Framers’ intent in making the Ninth Amendment. For example, Madison 
emphatically asserted that “‘the constitution is a bill of powers, the great 
residuum being the rights of the people.’”137 The Supreme Court in Griswold 
v. Connecticut reaffirmed the need to protect the unenumerated fundamental 
rights: 
 
[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be 
construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the 
                                                                                                                  
 133. Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 831. 
 135. Rose, supra note 92, at 720 (citation omitted). 
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 137. WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 121 (1996) 
(quoting James Madison). 
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Constitution guaranteed to the people. . . . And, the Ninth 
Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically 
mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in 
showing the existence of other fundamental personal rights, now 
protected from state, as well as federal, infringement.138 
 
As the citizens’ interests in public spaces are fundamental to human 
development, it is essential that their rights in this respect are recognized and 
protected by constitutional law. 
3. The Movement for Popular Constitutionalism 
 It may remain controversial that the Ninth Amendment can accommodate 
the public trust principle, since it is deemed by some courts and commentators 
as being intended to protect private rights.139 If the Ninth Amendment is not 
compatible with the public trust principle, then the idea of the living 
constitution or popular constitutionalism lends strong support to 
institutionalize it as one of the fundamental constitutional principles. As many 
scholars have argued, constitutionalism must be envisioned as living beyond 
the written text of the Constitution and the decisions made by the Supreme 
Court. “A ‘living constitution’ is one that evolves, changes over time, and 
adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.”140 Under this 
idea, our Constitution adapts to new circumstances in protecting citizens’ 
interests and improving social welfare and order. The canonical text of the 
Constitution remains unchanged, but the people’s will influences its 
interpretation. The practice includes a variety of statutes, executive 
                                                                                                                  
 138. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490, 493 (1965).  
 139. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and 
the Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any one of 
them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce 
the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that “[i]t is a common error, but an error 
nonetheless, to talk of 'ninth amendment rights.' The ninth amendment is not a source of rights as such; it 
is simply a rule about how to read the Constitution”). 
 140. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010). 
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materials,141 the courts’ decisions, and citizens’ popular will expressed 
through media and social movements.142 
 The public trust principle comports with the “living constitution” idea. 
The Framers, after all, did not foresee all the problems that would arise in the 
constitutional protection of citizens’ interests and social justice. In crafting the 
Constitution, the Framers prioritized the protection of individual liberties 
against undue government invasion. Although the “we the people” statement 
in the Preamble of the Constitution leaves considerable room for the 
Constitution to adapt to protect citizens’ interests in public space, no explicit 
and concrete measures for that purpose were adopted by the Framers when 
they wrote the Constitution.  For example, the Framers did not foresee the 
massive environmental degradation that humans could cause and the need to 
adopt measures to protect the environment.143 The public trust principle based 
on the “we the people” spirit makes our Constitution responsive to the 
changing needs to protect public spaces, in particular our natural environment, 
in order to sustain and improve our human condition. 
 Moreover, repeated attempts to use the public trust doctrine to protect the 
ecology and recreational uses of public spaces suggest that this is itself a Civil 
Rights Movement,144 urging us to radically alter our age-old practices and 
attitudes. The public trust principle inspired the rise of the environmental 
movement in the early 1970s and has boosted its momentum and carried it 
forward. Prompted by the environmental movement, various court decisions 
and statutes demonstrate the strong momentum in using the public trust 
principle to protect public space. Therefore, the past decades of judicial 
practice and numerous statutes enacted to protect public space suggest that 
these are all the ways in which the “we the people” idea has been accepted and 
reinforced in the changing world of constitutional practice and theory. 
                                                                                                                  
 141. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12–13 (2010) (proposing that the constitutional democracy advances by 
means of statutes that supplement or even supplant the written Constitution); Ernest A. Young, The 
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 408 (2007) (arguing that “‘the Constitution’ 
would include not only the canonical document but also a variety of statues, executive materials, and 
practices that structure our government”). 
 142. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 319 (1991); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 143. See KYSAR, supra note 88, at 229 (noting the desire of certain scholars and activists to 
constitutionalize environmental principles given the Constitution’s current propensity to “restrict the 
country’s ability to address the environmental needs of present and future citizens”). 
 144. Id. at 247–50 (discussing the role of the environmental and Civil Rights Movements in 
renewing our constitutionalism). 
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III. ENFORCING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES BY PROMOTING THE STEWARDSHIP 
ETHIC 
 In the preceding Part, I discussed how and why the public trust doctrine 
protects public spaces by conferring upon citizens four categories of public 
rights. Moreover, I argued that we use the public trust doctrine as a legal tool 
to carry out the public trust principle as one of the fundamental principles of 
constitutional law. While granting citizens fundamental rights over public 
space, the public trust principle underlying the public trust doctrine also 
impresses social responsibilities upon the stakeholders to protect public 
spaces. 
 In this Part, I will show that central to the public trust principle is the 
recognition and enforcement of social responsibilities that promote the 
stewardship ethic in protecting public space. Both rights and responsibilities 
form the foundation of the public trust principle. Moreover, these rights and 
responsibilities are interdependent on each other. The recognition and 
imposition of these social responsibilities, as this Part will show, stem from 
the need to protect the fundamental rights over public space as the collective 
rights of the citizens. In promoting the stewardship ethic, the enforcement of 
these social responsibilities, in turn, reinforces the protection of the 
fundamental rights. 
A. Defending the Public’s Collective Interest 
1. Collective Interests in Public Space 
 As shown in the preceding Part, based upon the longstanding rights of 
navigation, commerce, and fishing, aimed at protecting the economic 
interests of the public, many courts have expanded the scope of public rights 
to protect the citizens’ ecological, cultural, and political interests in public 
space. These fundamental rights, protected by the public trust principle, are 
by nature collectively held by members of the public. In this sense, they are 
not individual rights, but rather collective rights. 
 Under the public trust principle, everyone shares a stake in the public 
resources that form public space. Therefore, the realization of the collective 
rights is indispensable for cultivating human beings as social members and 
enhancing their interests in communal development.145 By contrast, 
                                                                                                                  
 145. RAZ, supra note 89, at 208 (arguing that collective rights protect “interests of individuals as 
members of a group in a public good and the [collective] right is a right to that public good because it 
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individual rights that protect private property, personal privacy, and so on, 
are bestowed upon persons primarily for the purpose of promoting their 
worth and dignity as individual human beings.146 
 The collective-rights approach to the public trust doctrine has afforded 
the courts with a vantage point to protect the public interest and reinforce the 
grounds on which they expand the scope of the doctrine. When invoking the 
public trust doctrine, courts have repeatedly underscored that the doctrine 
aims to protect the public’s rights to access or use the public trust resources, 
and every member of the public should enjoy such rights on equal terms. In 
Illinois Central, the Supreme Court drew on the collective-rights approach 
to establish a new way to protect the public interest in submerged lands by 
emphatically arguing as follows: 
 
[The title to submerged lands] is a title different in character from 
that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different 
from the title which the United States hold in the public lands 
which are open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for 
the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the 
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing 
therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private 
parties.147 
 
 According to this statement, citizens of the state have collective 
interests in entering and using the submerged lands in question for the 
purpose of navigation, commerce, and fishing. In this case, therefore, it is 
the public’s collective right to maintain access to those lands that have 
primacy over the individual interests of private parties seeking exclusive 
control of the lands. 
2. The Nature of the Collective Interests 
 Judging from the multitude of public trust cases, collective interests 
over public spaces have three salient attributes. First, they are not divisible 
                                                                                                                  
serves their interest as members of the group”). See also Leslie Green, Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 315, 320–24 (1991) (explaining why collective rights should be viewed as 
rights to collective interests). 
 146. For Kant, the protection of individual rights is based upon the premise that every human 
being has autonomy and self-worth, and should be treated as an end rather than means.  Thus, it reflects 
the categorical imperative laid out by Kant: “[A]ll rational beings come under the law that each of them 
must treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as ends in 
themselves.” IMMANUAL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 92 (Lara Denis ed., 
Thomas K. Abbott trans., Broadview Press 2005) (1785).  
 147. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (emphasis added). 
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in terms of how individuals can share the protected resources. Every 
member of the public is equally entitled to have access to and make use of 
the public trust resources that range from navigable waters and submerged 
lands to public squares and parks. Put differently, public trust resources are 
by nature an integral whole for members of the public rather than divisible 
and discrete parts available to be used only by particular persons.148 
 Second, the collective interests protected by the public trust doctrine are 
not alienable in any circumstances. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court 
enunciated a general rule governing allocation of public trust resources by 
mandating that “control of the State for the purposes of the [public] trust can 
never be lost.”149 Therefore, the government as the trustee of natural 
resources can never revoke the public’s collective interests or trade them 
away by transferring the resources to private parties. 
 The Supreme Court also laid down two exceptions to the general rule of 
inalienability by prescribing that a government can transfer public trust 
resources to private parties if and only if (1) they “are used in promoting the 
interests of the public,” or (2) the transfer is made “without any substantial 
impairment of the public interest.”150 Later, in Appleby v. City of New 
York,151 the Supreme Court further interpreted Illinois Central as allowing 
the grant of full fee to submerged waterways off Manhattan Island.152 The 
Appleby Court read the two exceptions carved out in Illinois Central as 
having prohibited only the “gross perversion” of the public trust and 
“abdication of sovereign governmental power,” not the alienation per se of 
the public trust resources.153 These two exceptions show that the collective 
interests in the public trust resources are not alienable even in the 
circumstances where the government transfers ownership of a resource to a 
private party.  In other words, even if the government changes the ownership 
status of the resources held under public trust, the public’s collective 
interests remain unchangeable. Given this inalienability, the public can still 
exercise its rights in certain public trust resources that have come under 
private control through the conveyance of ownership by the government. 
                                                                                                                  
 148. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000) (“[T]he public trust 
doctrine applies to all water resources, unlimited by any surface-ground distinction.”); Arnold v. Mundy, 
6 N.J.L. 1, 77 (N.J. 1821) (concluding that the coasts of the sea and all navigable rivers in which the tide 
ebbs and flows, including the water and land under the water, are “common to all the citizens, and that 
each [citizen] has a right to use them according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate 
that use”).  
 149. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926). 
 152. Id. at 402–03. 
 153. Id. at 393. 
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 Third, the collective interests in public trust resources are exogenous, 
partly because the realization of those interests hinges on how we deal with 
the non-human elements of public spaces. The second Part demonstrated 
that non-human objects, whether made naturally or by men, form an 
indispensable part of the human condition.154 We could not realize our 
collective interests without preserving or protecting the non-human objects 
as “members” of public space. The exogenous nature of the collective 
interests is also reflected in the impact that our use of public spaces has on 
how future generations will be able to use public space. This is largely 
because public resources are depletable. If one human generation damages 
or even exhausts certain public resources, the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs by using these resources would be compromised. 
B. Social Responsibilities and the Stewardship Ethic  
 The public trust principle itself, as shown in the preceding section, 
embraces an expansive coverage over human collective interests in public 
space. The collective interests are by nature indivisible, inalienable, and 
exogenous. Therefore, the fundamental rights that the public trust principle 
protects are by nature collective rights for the public to enjoy. 
 The collective-interest attributes of the fundamental rights protected by 
the public trust principle make the protection of public resources quite 
intricate. The allocation of these resources has a direct or indirect impact on 
each member of the public, non-human objects, and future generations. 
These effects heighten the importance of the ways in which resources in 
public space must be protected by the stakeholders. The public trust 
principle accordingly impresses upon those stakeholders strong social 
responsibilities toward the members of the public, non-human objects in 
public space, and future generations as well.155 By imposing these social 
responsibilities, the public trust principle promotes the stewardship ethic for 
protecting public space. 
 In the following section, I will argue that as a legal tool to enforce the 
public trust principle, the public trust doctrine relies on social 
responsibilities that promote the stewardship ethic to protect collective 
rights over public space. To this end, the doctrine holds the government, the 
judiciary, and each member of the public as stakeholders responsible for 
                                                                                                                  
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 71–73. 
 155. See, e.g., Richard Worrell & Michael C. Appleby, Stewardship of Natural Resources: 
Definition, Ethical and Practical Aspects, 12 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 263, 263 (1999) (“Stewardship 
is the responsible use (including conservation) of natural resources in a way that takes full and balanced 
account of the interests of society, future generations, and other species . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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protecting public spaces. It impresses both positive and negative 
responsibilities upon the governmental bodies and agencies and the judiciary 
on the one hand, and upon individuals on the other. As stewards of our 
public spaces, the government, the judiciary, and individuals as members of 
the public are supposed to work together under the guidance of the 
stewardship ethic. The extent to which collective rights can be protected 
depends on how the public trust doctrine is used to enforce the social 
responsibilities imposed on the stakeholders of public space. 
1. Government as Steward of Public Space 
 Under the public trust framework, the state is the trustee that manages 
specific natural resources for the benefit of current and future generations as 
the beneficiaries of this public trust relationship. This is the orthodox model 
of the public trust doctrine, which emphasizes the central role of the state as 
the trustee for the preservation of certain natural resources. Under the public 
trust doctrine, the government has the trustee power to regulate or dispose of 
natural resources, along with its political responsibility to promote and 
protect the public’s collective interests over those resources.  
 In the conventional trusteeship model, the doctrine imposes only 
negative responsibilities upon the government, requiring it not to act in 
certain ways that run counter to its responsibilities. Accordingly, the 
doctrine requires that the government shall not convey public trust resources 
to any private parties unless this would benefit the public interest. For 
example, in Illinois Central the Supreme Court stated that 
 
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be 
lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the 
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and 
waters remaining.156 
 
 However, with the expansion of the scope of the public trust doctrine to 
tackle environmental protection issues, a new model of the doctrine adds 
positive responsibilities on the government. I call it the “stewardship 
model.” Under the new model, in addition to its negative responsibilities, the 
government is required to act affirmatively and proactively to protect the 
                                                                                                                  
 156. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). See also Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d  
795, 799 (Fla. 1957) (“[The public resource in question] is held in trust for the people for purposes of 
navigation, fishing, bathing and similar uses. Such title is not held primarily for purposes of sale or 
conversion into money. Basically it is trust property and should be devoted to the fulfillment of the 
purposes of the trust, towit [sic]: the service of the people.”). 
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citizens’ collective interests in public spaces. Courts have repeatedly 
emphasized that the government has “the right and the duty to protect and 
preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does 
not derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the 
people.”157 In this context, the Mono Lake court, for example, articulated the 
state duty as “an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the 
planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses 
whenever feasible.”158 
 The stewardship model requires the government to take affirmative 
measures regarding substantive and procedural values in protecting the 
public trust resources. First, with regard to the substantive responsibilities, 
the government is required to act to protect resources from being damaged. 
Meeting this positive responsibility depends on whether the government acts 
diligently, prudently, and in good faith. For example, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court upheld a state project, challenged by oyster fishermen, that flooded 
oyster beds to help recover the coastline and to enhance wildlife and 
fisheries.159 According to the court, the state’s public trust duty to prevent 
the loss of coastal land validated the project, despite the loss of oyster beds 
and impact on local fishermen.160 Similarly, a Virginia appeals court cited 
the public trust doctrine in upholding a state agency’s order for a riparian 
landowner to remove unpermitted structures on a pier that interfered with 
public trust resources.161 
 The government is also required to take measures to stop actions that 
cause harm to public spaces. For example, acting as trustee of natural 
resources, the State of Idaho required a company to make a million-dollar 
effort to remove oil leaked into Idaho’s St. Joe River.162 Moreover, courts 
have also used the doctrine to help the government or people to recover 
damages they sustained due to the pollution of public trust natural 
resources.163 
                                                                                                                  
 157. In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). See also Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (“[T]he public trust is more 
than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the 
duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, 
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent 
with the purposes of the trust.”). 
 158. Nat’l Audobon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728. 
 159. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (La. 2004). 
 160. Id. at 1101–02. 
 161. Evelyn v. Commonwealth Marine Res. Comm’n, 621 S.E.2d 130, 140 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
 162. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 1067 (3rd ed. 2004). 
 163. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
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 In addition to these substantive responsibilities, the government is also 
required to follow the due procedure in disclosing relevant information 
about the management of public trust resources. This disclosure is important 
because it both informs the public of how the legislative and administrative 
decisions are adopted, and also gives the public the chance to respond to 
legislative bodies or administrative agencies if they believe that the 
decisions were poorly made. Thus, the information disclosure requirement 
fosters public engagement in the governmental decision-making process 
concerning public resources. To follow this procedural requirement, 
Vermont, for example, has issued public guidelines describing the types of 
“encroachment” projects that are permissible under the public trust doctrine 
(e.g., water intakes and docks).164 The document describes the factors 
considered when determining whether a project is consistent with public 
trust values.165 
2. Judiciary as Steward of Public Space 
 To protect collective interests, the public trust doctrine impresses 
responsibilities on courts as well. They are required to render judicial 
decisions to fulfill their responsibilities when either the government or 
individual parties have taken actions that harm collective human interests in 
public spaces. In this sense, the judiciary acts as the steward of public space. 
 The idea of judicial responsibility in this regard differs from the 
conventional wisdom on the public trust doctrine, which focuses on courts’ 
judicial review power to consider the validity of the government’s state 
action in managing protected resources. The stewardship view goes beyond 
the courts’ power to overturn decisions made by the government and 
underscores the responsibility of the courts to ensure that collective human 
interests are safeguarded when state actions are taken to manage public trust 
resources. The courts, in this scenario, act as stewards defending the 
collective interest in public trust resources.166 For example, with respect to 
navigable waters and the land underneath them, the Supreme Court in 
Illinois Central ruled that the government in Illinois must protect the public 
interest constantly when it makes decisions to allocate public trust 
                                                                                                                  
 164. See VT. AGENCY OF NATURAL RES., GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY ACT 250 AND SECTION 248 
COMMENTS REGARDING RIPARIAN BUFFERS (2005), available at www.anr.state.vt.us/site/html/buff/ 
BufferGuidanceFINAL-120905.pdf. 
 165. Id. at 14. 
 166. For a similar view, see Peter Manus, To A Candidate in Search of an Environmental Theme: 
Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 330 (2000) (“The public trust doctrine is the legal 
receptacle for the government’s long-term duty, as supported by the judicial system, to manage and 
perpetuate the public enjoyment of natural resources.”).  
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resources.167 Accordingly, if the state action fails the standard of review 
enunciated in Illinois Central, courts would invalidate the government’s 
decisions regarding allocation of public trust resources and would denounce 
its “abdication”168 of its political responsibility to protect the public’s 
collective rights. 
 The judicial oversight of state action regarding allocation of public trust 
resources, in effect, empowers the court to overturn decisions made by the 
government as the representative of the public at large. Antimajoritarian as it 
is, the public trust doctrine as the basis of this judicial power is legitimized 
by its role in remedying “the tyranny of the minority” problem that can arise 
in the democratic decision-making process.169 The conundrum inherent in 
modern democracy, as Carl Schmitt observed, is that political institutions as 
the venue for deliberating and deciding upon the public good may have been 
transformed into institutions for powerful interest groups to negotiate and 
bargain for power and resources.170 Those powerful interest groups, 
routinely formed by large business organizations, are the “minority” parties 
in the society when compared to the public as the “majority” whose 
collective interest are supposed to be of central importance in democratic 
governance.171 
 These “minority” groups are able to drastically reduce the inclusive, 
democratic deliberation in the legislative and administrative process to the 
narrow scope of a business meeting concerning the distribution of interests 
among these interests. Because they wield an unparalleled wealth of 
resources, these “minority” groups are extremely active in penetrating the 
structure of democratic deliberation by controlling some or most of the 
representatives of the public, such as senators and governors.172 When these 
representatives become their “loudspeakers” in the political decision-making 
process, democratic deliberation degenerates into “an empty formality” and 
“superfluous decoration” for the public at large.173 
 State action regarding allocation of natural resources is indeed very 
vulnerable to this “tyranny of the minority” problem. Given that public trust 
resources have enormous market value, any proprietary control of them 
would surely generate windfall profits for private parties. Not surprisingly, 
                                                                                                                  
 167. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
 168. Id. (“Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the 
government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public.”). 
 169. CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 6–7 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 1985). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 6.  
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this gives rise to rent-seeking activities174 that may be aggressively pursued 
by private parties with strong economic clout.175 By bribing or lobbying 
government officials in power, these parties take possession of a public trust 
resource. In contrast, the public at large is always diffuse and unorganized; it 
is relatively hard to get the public organized to take part in the government’s 
decision-making process about public trust resources. Too often, the public 
at large is simply unable to wage a struggle to counter the powerful rent-
seeking activities of large corporations. 
 Therefore, courts use their judicial review power to fulfill their 
responsibility to protect the public’s collective rights against the tyranny of 
the minority that may occur if an interest group skews the government’s 
allocation of public resources. As Sax insightfully observed, the public trust 
doctrine “is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections 
in the legislative and administrative process.”176 To do so, the doctrine 
empowers courts to “promote equality of political power for . . . [the] 
disorganized and diffused [public as the] majority” whose interest is easily 
jeopardized by the “self-interested and powerful minorities [who] often have 
an undue influence on” governmental resource management.177 
 Central to the judicial scrutiny of the government’s decisions is an 
inquiry as to whether the government has fulfilled its role as a steward of 
public trust resources. Acting as a separate steward of public trust resources, 
courts investigate whether the government has fulfilled its responsibilities 
for serving the public interest. To examine the substantive value issues, 
courts have relied on the standard of review used in Illinois Central to 
determine whether the government has fulfilled its political responsibilities. 
Guided by the public purpose principle stated in Illinois Central,178 courts 
have defined how to determine whether the government’s decisions in 
conveying ownership serve the public interest. For example, in Wisconsin v. 
                                                                                                                  
 174. Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources in an effort to capture these supra-normal 
returns. Lobbying for special legislative privileges is a classic example. See generally James M. 
Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 3 
(James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). 
 175. See Ragnar Torvik, Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare, 67 J. DEV. ECON. 455 
(2002) (outlining the problem of rent-seeking behavior in natural resources management). 
 176. Sax, supra note 8, at 509. 
 177. Id. at 560; Matthew Park, The Public Trust Doctrine: Ensuring the Public's Natural Right of 
(Perpetual) Access to Common Resources 5 (Mar. 10, 2010) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Victoria) 
(on file with UVicDSpace, University of Victoria), available at https://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8443 
//handle.net/1828/2344 (click on “Park M. LLM.pdf” at the bottom of the page) (“By prescribing a principled 
approach to environmental decision making, the public trust doctrine serves as a democratizing force by 
preventing the monopolizing of trust resources into private and unaccountable hands.”). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 28–31 and 155–57. 
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Public Service Commission,179a case involving a challenge to the 
legislature’s grant of a lakebed to the City of Madison, the court introduced 
a five-factor standard that should be met: 
 
1. Public bodies will control the use of the area. 2. The area will 
be devoted to public purposes and open to the public. 3. The 
diminution of lake area will be very small when compared to the 
whole of [the lake]. 4. No one of the public uses of the lake as a 
lake will be destroyed or greatly impaired. 5. The disappointment 
of those members of the public who may desire to boat, fish, or 
swim in the area to be filled is negligible when compared with the 
greater convenience to be afforded those members of the public 
who use the city park.180 
 
 Regarding procedural issues, courts have examined whether the 
government’s decision-making has adequately considered the interests of 
major stakeholders through open and fair procedures.181 To this end, the 
court could consider whether decisions are made with sufficient public 
notice so as to keep the public reasonably informed and give the public 
sufficient time to prepare and organize to respond.182 In particular, the 
doctrine requires that the legislative body must take measures to have 
representatives of the public closely involved in the decision-making 
process.183 For example, the legislative body may invite civil society 
organizations such as environmental NGOs to present their concerns about 
the impact of any proposed new laws on the public interest in access to, and 
use of, public trust resources. Courts can strike down any law enacted 
without participation by the representatives of the public, or order the 
legislature to revise the law by actively having those representatives 
engaged in the process. 
 Besides their role as stewards against wrongdoings committed by the 
government, courts have also acted as stewards for the public to prevent 
private parties from harming the public interest. What courts do in this 
domain definitely goes beyond their role as the judicial check on state 
                                                                                                                  
 179. Wisconsin v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 71 (Wis. 1957). 
 180. Id. at 73–74. 
 181. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 314–15 (1986) (noting that empirical research shows that lobbying is most effective when 
the interest group's goals are narrow and the legislation involves issues of “low-visibility” from the 
general public's perspective). 
 182. See, e.g., ROBERT COX, ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 84 
(2nd ed. 2010) (discussing the importance of protecting the public’s right to access information and to 
comment on environmental matters). 
 183. Id. 
610 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 35:563 
 
action, as contended by public trust protagonists led by Professor Sax.184 
Sometimes the harm caused by private parties to public spaces can be too 
serious to wait for the time-consuming legislative process to respond or for 
the inactive or even corrupted executive to take necessary action. Courts 
may fulfill their responsibilities by issuing injunctions to swiftly order a halt 
to damaging private actions. The judicial actions can also provide remedies 
to affected members of the public to compensate for the damage they have 
suffered. 
 For example, in United States v. Snook, the Seventh Circuit held Snook 
criminally liable for knowingly reporting to the government materially wrong 
information about the quality of wastewater he was entrusted to monitor.185 
The court argued that: 
 
The Clean Water Act is public-welfare legislation and the victims of 
violations are the public . . . . [F]or over three years [the] 
wastewater had numerous violations that went undetected because 
Snook, in his unique position as Environmental Manager, did not 
report them. Moreover, unlike other self-reporting situations 
(taxpayers, for example), the regulations here apply to matters that 
directly and significantly affect the public's health and safety.186  
 
Given Snook’s blatant violation of the public trust and the magnitude of the 
environmental degradation due to his violation, the court upheld a sentencing 
increase.187 Judicial decisions of this type exemplify the important role of 
courts in preventing and stopping damaging private actions.188 
3. Individuals as Stewards of Public Space 
 The public trust doctrine also imposes social responsibilities on 
individuals as members of the public. This is of primary importance because 
approximately one-third of property claimed by the states to be public trust 
                                                                                                                  
 184. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 63. 
 185. United States v. Snook, 366 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 186. Id. at 445–46. 
 187. Id. at 446. 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 366 F.3d 1178, 1180 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding sentence 
enhancement for discharging pollutants into wetlands of the United States); United States v. Gonzalez-
Alvarez, 277 F.3d 73, 81–82 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that abuse-of-trust increase applied to dairy farmer 
for not complying with regulations); United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 372–73 (6th Cir. 2001) (same 
in context of employee at water-treatment plant); United States v. Turner, 102 F.3d 1350, 1360 (4th Cir. 
1996) (same in context of owners and operators of coal mine). But see United States v. Technic Servs., 
Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1049 (2002) (refusing to apply an abuse-of-trust increase to an asbestos remediation 
private contractor). 
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property is in private rather than public hands.189 Social responsibilities 
constrain private action under circumstances in which public needs in 
privately-controlled resources must be accommodated. These responsibilities 
have been legally enforced by the public trust doctrine against individual 
property owners. 
 Courts have invoked the public trust doctrine to order the opening of 
private property to accommodate public access and use. In this circumstance, 
courts routinely ascertain that public access to, or use of, the relevant private 
property is the necessary condition by which the public can meaningfully 
exercise their collective rights over trust resources. For example, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court found that the “[e]xercise of the public’s right to swim 
and bathe below the mean high water mark may depend upon a right to pass 
across the upland beach. Without some means of access the public right to use 
the foreshore would be meaningless.”190 Hence, the court ruled that the public 
must be afforded access through privately-owned upland areas as necessary 
for them to exercise their public trust right to bathe or swim in the foreshore 
areas. 
 The public trust doctrine also requires that private parties who obtain 
ownership of public trust resources from the government must accommodate 
public access to, and use of, those resources under their control.  The private 
ownership conferred by the government is seen as a bifurcated title. The party 
has acquired private ownership over the resource concerned; this title, under 
the common law, is recognized as jus privatum. But the title is subject to the 
public’s collective rights over the resources concerned; the common law 
regards these collective rights over public trust resources as jus publicum 
protected by the state.191 The bifurcated title shows that while the government 
can alienate public trust resources on appropriate occasions, it cannot give up 
its responsibility to protect public interests in those resources. Thus the public 
can still exercise their rights over privately controlled resources obtained from 
the government’s privatization schemes.192 For example, regarding littoral 
                                                                                                                  
 189. Smith & Sweeney, supra note 17, at 332. 
 190. Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984). Moreover, in an earlier 
case the court also stated that “a modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine dictates 
that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.” Neptune 
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
 191. See, e.g., Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 399 (1926) (ruling that the ownership 
of submerged lands carrying both the jus publicum and the jus privatum belonged to a private party); 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894) (holding that “the title, jus privatum, in [tidelands] . . . belongs 
to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him, as the 
representative of the nation and for the public benefit”); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 
2005) (“Jus publicum refers to public rights in navigable waters and the land covered by those waters; jus 
privatum, in contrast, refers to private property rights held subject to the public trust.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65 (“At common law, our courts articulated a distinction 
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rights granted by the government, courts have repeatedly held that “although 
the state retains the authority to convey lakefront property to private parties, it 
necessarily conveys such property subject to the public trust.”193 
 By requiring public accommodations on private property, the public trust 
doctrine imposes upon property owners both negative and positive social 
responsibilities. For the negative responsibility, the doctrine requires that 
private property owners not use their property in a manner that prevents the 
public from exercising their collective rights under the public trust doctrine. In 
fact, the imposition of negative responsibilities reflects a long-recognized 
principle that “all property . . . is held under the implied obligation that the 
owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community”194 or other 
individuals.195 For instance, in Orion Corp. v. State, Orion Corporation, the 
owner of 5,600 acres of Padilla Bay tidelands in Washington attempted to 
dredge and fill Padilla Bay to create a residential community.196 The court 
held that Orion’s purchase of the tidelands was subject to the public trust and 
must accommodate public interests, the jus publicum interest of all the 
citizens.197 Hence, Orion Corporation had a responsibility not to dredge and 
fill the tidelands so as to “substantially impair the public rights of navigation 
and fishing, as well as incidental rights and purposes [for boating, swimming, 
or water skiing].”198 Similarly, filling of tidal waters was also invalidated in 
Palazzolo v. State199 based on the public trust doctrine. Courts have also held 
that private owners have a responsibility not to erect fences on their properties 
that would prevent the public from exercising the right to walk on the lake 
shores below the high water mark200 or to use the lake waters.201  
                                                                                                                  
between jus privatum and jus publicum to capture this principle: the alienation of littoral property to 
private parties leaves intact public rights in the lake and its submerged land.”); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 
P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) (“The state can no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than 
it can ‘abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the 
peace.’”) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)). 
 193. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65. 
 194. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (citations omitted).  
 195. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(contending that “the right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not so use it as to create a public 
nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.”). 
 196. Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1073. In an earlier case, the court required littoral property owners to remove fills that 
prevented submergence of their shoreline and thus impeded their neighbors’ access to the adjoining lake. 
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969) (en banc). 
 199. Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, at *29 (R.I. Super. Ct., 2005). 
 200. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 66 (explaining that “the public trust extends to all land 
below the ordinary high water mark”). 
 201. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Davis, 19 N.W. 103, 111 (Mich. 1884) (“There can be no doubt of the 
right of the state to forbid any erections within such parts of the water as are strictly navigable, and to 
regulate the distance beyond which no private erections can be maintained.”). 
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 With respect to positive responsibilities, private property owners are 
required by the public trust doctrine to carry out certain tasks to facilitate the 
public’s exercise of their collective rights. For instance, given that access 
through dry sand areas is indispensable for the public to make recreational use 
of the foreshore areas, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered that private 
property owners are required to afford the public not only “reasonable access 
to the foreshore” but also “a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.”202  
IV. RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
 In the Part that follows, I will consider how the new theoretical 
foundation of the public trust doctrine and the new mode of the doctrine 
proposed in this Article can contribute to responses to attacks on the doctrine. 
As demonstrated in Part I, critics have attacked the public trust doctrine by 
focusing on its emphasis on judicial intervention in the management of public 
resources. They criticized Sax and his followers for using the doctrine to 
promote a judiciary-based, top-to-bottom model for regulating public spaces, 
which results in giving too much power to courts. 
 In contrast, the social–political theory I propose in this Article shows that 
the public trust doctrine is by no means a legal tool that simply relies on courts 
to protect public resources. Instead, the doctrine is founded on the public trust 
principle, aimed at affording constitutional protection of fundamental rights 
over public space. Based on this social–political foundation, the public trust 
doctrine embodies a new mode of application that invokes social 
responsibilities in order to promote a stewardship ethic of protecting public 
space. 
 Therefore, the earlier attacks on the public trust doctrine would falter, 
given that the doctrine is in fact a dynamic and comprehensive legal tool that 
does not center on the top-down role of the judiciary. Rather, the doctrine 
embodies both top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top mechanisms in protecting 
public space. On the one hand, the practice of the doctrine closely involves the 
government and judiciary as stewards of the public trust; the decisions passed 
down by them are of pivotal importance in protecting public spaces. On the 
other hand, individuals as members of the public also play an important part. 
Exercising the collective rights bestowed upon them, members of the public 
also act as stewards of public spaces and can press both the government and 
judiciary to protect public space in a manner conducive to the public interest. 
 Based on this central response to the attacks on the public trust doctrine, I 
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will examine more problems in these attacks in the following three sections 
and discuss how the social–political theory I propose can address these 
problems. I will also explain more about the merits of the public trust doctrine 
compared with the alternatives proposed by the critics. 
A. Concern about Judicial Incompetence  
 As shown in Part I, some critics faulted the proponents of the public trust 
doctrine for their ignorance of evidence that legislative bodies and 
administrative agencies have considerable expertise to deal with increasingly 
complex environmental problems.203 In their view, the legislative bodies and 
administrative agencies are the proper institutions to develop a comprehensive 
regulatory regime for environmental protection, and not the courts, which lack 
adequate expertise to address a host of environmental problems. 
 It is true that the institutions in the government (such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency) can acquire the expertise to respond to 
ever-changing and increasingly complex environmental problems. But the 
harsh reality is that our natural environment has suffered significant 
deterioration in the past few decades despite the government’s increasing 
experience in regulating environmental pollution.204 This massive failure has 
occurred for a variety of reasons,205 with the government’s vulnerability to 
lobbying efforts by the polluting industries probably the most important 
factor.206 
 The social–political theory I propose in this Article accommodates the 
need to tap into the government’s expertise in dealing with environmental 
problems, since the government is deemed to be a steward of public spaces. 
More importantly, the public trust principle may help the government to 
legitimize the measures it adopts to protect public space at large, given that 
the government has a responsibility to protect fundamental rights over 
                                                                                                                  
 203. See,e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 204. See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, at x–xi (2004) (discussing the massive scale of the environmental problems 
facing the world). 
 205. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental 
Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (pointing out that “national standards may not be 
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restoration activities or federal standards are inadequate to restore affected resources to a state’s more 
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 206. See, e.g., Dan Bacher, How Oil Lobbyists Are Writing California's Environmental Laws, 
COUNTER PUNCH (July 16–18, 2010), http://www.counterpunch.org/bacher07162010.html; Jim Walker, 
Cruise Industry Spent $400,000 Last Quarter Lobbying Against Safety & Environmental Regulations, 
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public space. In Part II, I demonstrated that our Constitution lacks any direct 
and explicit provisions for protecting the citizens’ fundamental rights over 
public space, with the result that the government at the federal level may not 
have adequate power under the Constitution to take measures to protect 
public spaces. For example, the Supreme Court has struck down federal 
statutes that regulated environmental pollution or bearing of guns in school 
areas (which are public spaces) on the basis that the federal government 
does not have the authority to enact these statutes.207 
 Apart from accommodating and legitimizing the government’s 
regulatory measures, the social–political theory I propose would generate a 
more comprehensive way to protect public spaces. This is because it 
combines the agenda of protecting citizens’ fundamental rights over public 
space with the enforcement of social responsibilities centered on protecting 
public spaces. In doing so, it seeks to engage and mobilize not only the 
government and judiciary, but also individuals as members of the public, to 
become stakeholders in protecting public space. 
 Under the social–political theory, the synergy between fundamental 
rights and social responsibilities is generated by applying both the bottom-
to-top and top-to-bottom modes of the public trust doctrine. First, the 
bottom-to-top mode mobilizes grassroots power to protect a variety of 
public resources, entitling every citizen standing to sue wrongdoers. 
Meanwhile, the top-to-bottom mode of the public trust doctrine mandates 
the government to take a proactive approach in managing public resources. 
 Motivated by the environmental movement, the expansive application of 
the public trust doctrine has granted open standing to members of the public to 
challenge the potentially inappropriate use of public resources by the 
government or private parties. In Paepcke v. Public Building Commission, the 
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that citizens had standing as beneficiaries of 
public trust resources to challenge the diverting of public park space for the 
construction of school buildings.208 Later, in the landmark National Audubon 
Society decision, the California Supreme Court sweepingly reaffirmed that 
“any member of the general public . . . has standing to raise a claim of harm to 
the public trust.”209 
 The collective rights approach bestows upon any member of the public 
the standing to sue because it recognizes that each member of the public 
enjoys an indivisible and inalienable interest in the resources held under 
public trust. If the government or any private parties cause harm to the 
                                                                                                                  
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
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public trust resources, the wrongdoing will cause direct or indirect harm not 
only to one individual citizen but also to all the members of the public.210 
Thus, the court in Paepcke noted that “[i]f the ‘public trust’ doctrine is to 
have any meaning or vitality at all, the members of the public, at least 
taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust, must have the right and 
standing to enforce it.”211 It not only entitles citizens to sue against the 
wrongdoings of the government or any private parties, but also empowers 
them to seek remedies in court when the law is silent or the government is 
inactive. The court also observed that “[t]o tell [people] that they must wait 
upon governmental action is often an effectual denial of the right for all 
time.”212  In a case involving a shooting range that was disturbing residential 
neighbors, the court found a MERA violation for impairment of “quietude” 
and enjoined the range’s operation even though there were no local or state 
noise standards in place.213 Indeed, state statutory law prohibited state 
agencies from even enacting such standards.214 
 Therefore, the public trust doctrine is a gap-filling tool that makes our 
system actively responsive to changing circumstances and social needs. 
Under this public trust framework, any members of the public, both in 
theory and practice, can become watchdogs of how the trust resources are 
used. With the active involvement of the general public, it mobilizes the 
grassroots power to closely monitor how the public trust resources are used. 
 The collective rights approach also encourages the government to 
become proactive in managing public trust resources. This is partly the 
result of the standing entitlement bestowed by the collective rights upon the 
members of the public; the government is put under the pressure that it will 
be sued by its citizens if it mismanages public trust resources. In response, 
the government is more likely to take measures to manage the resources in 
an appropriate way. 
 Informed by the collective rights approach, the government is also more 
likely to institute a decision-making process that comprehensively examines 
the impact of its decisions on the collective interests of the public.  In certain 
circumstances, the public includes future generations, and we cannot harm 
or even deplete the resources that they will need. Armed with this vision, the 
                                                                                                                  
 210. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. Ct. 
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government will surely behave more cautiously because its decisions always 
have a serious and comprehensive impact on the public at large. After all, if 
the government is repeatedly reminded that taking proactive measures is a 
mandate under the public trust doctrine, governmental decisions are more 
likely to be in the public interest. 
B. Concern About the Danger of Judicial Supremacy  
 Some critics, as shown in Part I,215 also worry about the role of the 
public trust doctrine in subverting the democratic order by giving too much 
power to the courts. In their view, an active and expansive application of the 
public trust doctrine will inevitably lead to judicial supremacy by letting the 
courts have the last say on every decision about resource management. In 
opposing this alleged threat to democracy, critics argue that courts do not 
have this kind of power or the expertise to review the decisions of the 
government. 
 Using the public trust doctrine, I proposed in the preceding two Parts 
that there is a new way to justify judicial review. The courts derive this 
power from their responsibility as stewards of public spaces, which requires 
them to defend the citizens’ collective rights. 
 The practice of the public trust doctrine clearly demonstrates that there 
are ecological, economic, and cultural manipulations in the allocation and 
management of public resources. When there are manipulative actions that 
cause harm to public space, courts must decide when suits are brought to 
them. It is their responsibility to protect public spaces that makes it 
necessary for them to exercise the judicial review power. In this capacity, 
the courts act as the stewards of citizens’ fundamental rights. 
 Courts have indeed played an indispensable role in breaking barriers to 
justice and freedom in times of crisis.216 A court in England invalidated a 
monopoly in trade granted by Queen Elizabeth I dating back to the late 
sixteenth century.217 In the new millennium, it was the Supreme Court that 
liberated homosexuals from the homophobia inherent in anti-sodomy laws218 
and denounced the deprivation of Guantánamo detainees’ constitutional right 
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to challenge their detention in American courts.219 These crises have 
resonance with Rousseau’s warning: “Nothing is more dangerous than the 
influence of private interests on public affairs, and abuse of the laws by the 
Government is a lesser evil than the corruption of the Lawgiver. . . .”220 
Indeed, all of these crises, together with the environmental crisis in our natural 
and cultural ecosystems, clearly reveal the potential manipulative power 
wielded by interest groups and legislatures. When courts can use the judicial 
review power to fulfill their responsibilities to protect private rights that are 
recognized as fundamental rights under the Constitution, the same must apply 
to the protection of fundamental rights over public resources and public space. 
After all, the protection of both private rights and public rights, as 
demonstrated in Part II,221 are equally important for human development. We 
cannot ignore the role of courts in defending public rights while putting them 
to work in the protection of private rights. 
 The recent litigation about Burholme Park in downtown Philadelphia 
demonstrates how courts can exercise the judicial review power to fulfill 
their responsibilities under the public trust doctrine.222 In this case, the Fox 
Chase Cancer Center, one of the nation’s top hospitals devoted to cancer 
treatment, research, and prevention, entered into a lease agreement with the 
City of Philadelphia to expand its campus into Burholme Park, which stands 
next to the Center and is used by people for recreation.223 The core question 
was whether the court should uphold or overturn the government’s decision 
to lease the parkland for the economic development of the city, as the Fox 
Center’s expansion into the park would create more jobs and provide the 
city with funds.224 
 In this case, the court fulfilled its judicial responsibilities under the 
public trust doctrine and protected the recreational uses of the park by the 
public. It ruled that “so long as a community or neighborhood actively uses 
dedicated park land, the City is required to hold such land in trust for their 
use, is legally estopped from divesting such land and is required to maintain 
these open spaces as public parks.”225 
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 Any institutional design, to a larger or lesser degree, carries defects, and 
the public trust doctrine and the court’s role in defending the public interest 
are no exceptions. In order to avoid judicial supremacy, courts in exercising 
their judicial review power should show deference to the expertise of the 
legislative bodies and administrative agencies. 
C. Concern About the Tragedy of the Commons  
 Some opponents of the public trust doctrine, as shown in Part I,226 also 
criticized the doctrine for triggering takings of private property without fair 
compensation. But they seem to have ignored the social responsibilities that 
private property owners must assume in order to protect public space. 
 As shown in Part III,227 individuals, as well as the government and 
judiciary, act as stewards of public space. Therefore, the public trust 
doctrine bestows upon individuals social responsibilities to protect public 
spaces as well. When it comes to cases that deal with takings of property, 
the inquiry should not just focus on the extent to which property owners 
enjoy exclusive rights; their social responsibilities also need to be fully taken 
into account. 
 For example, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council,228 a 
decision frequently cited by opponents in their attacks on the public trust 
doctrine,229 upheld the South Carolina Coastal Council’s restriction imposed 
on the use of property that includes tidelands.230 The decision was based on 
the fact that Mr. McQueen, the property owner concerned, had 
responsibilities to contribute to the preservation of the tidelands in his 
parcels of property. The public trust doctrine used by court to rule against 
the takings claim imposes social responsibilities on property owners, and the 
court accordingly held that the doctrine places “a restriction on McQueen’s 
property rights inherent in the ownership of property bordering tidal 
water.”231 
 The opponents of the public trust doctrine turn a blind eye to the social 
responsibilities that ought to be imposed on property owners, largely 
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because they believe that the right to exclude is the essence of private 
property protection.232 Being highly concerned about the danger posed by 
the public trust doctrine to private property, the critics see privatization of 
resources as a panacea for addressing a host of social problems. To them, 
promoting privatization and strengthening private property protection are 
central to maintaining a free and healthy society. The public trust doctrine, 
however, stands in the way to prevent massive privatization of public 
resources. 
 The rhetoric of the tragedy of the commons lends the strongest support 
to these critics’ proposals. It teaches that privatization is one solution for the 
overuse or depletion of natural resources.233 Moreover, given the heightened 
difficulty in reaching agreement due to the increased transaction costs when 
the number of parties increases, the theory of collective action further adds 
to the rhetorical basis for preferring privatization of natural resources.234 The 
economic justification for privatizing natural resources thus centers on the 
need to allocate exclusive control over resources to those who can make 
optimal use of them. It further highlights the role of the free market in 
bringing about maximization of wealth for personal and social 
development.235 
 Yet privatization begs the question of why certain natural resources, 
such as the Mississippi River and Central Park in New York City, ought to 
be held in public trust and not subject to private ownership. The rationale 
against expansive privatization of natural resources, by and large, stems 
from the fact that the free market, despite its liberty-promoting function, 
results in coercion by creating monopolization of resources. In a modern 
society, it is inevitable for every person to get involved in the trade that 
takes place in the marketplace. While every person has an equal nominal 
status as a trading participant in the marketplace, the type or amount of 
resources that they control in fact differs from one person to another. 
Therefore, the bargaining power they have for negotiating deals in the 
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marketplace always varies from person to person, and people with stronger 
bargaining power can coerce others into following their commands.236 
 From the bargaining-power perspective, an expansive privatization of 
natural resources would bring out the problem that the private owner could 
coerce members of the public. For example, by relying on the right to 
exclude, a private owner may prevent the public from exercising their public 
trust rights, such as walking across the private beach for fishing, bathing, or 
swimming in the sea, and walking along privately-owned lake shores to 
relax.237 The public trust doctrine has been invoked by courts to stop the use 
of coercive power in this kind of case. For example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled that the public is entitled to have unimpeded access to, 
and make reasonable use of, privately-owned dry sand beaches to use the 
foreshore areas for recreational purposes.238 
 In addition, if certain natural resources that are social necessities fall 
into private control, property owners may charge access and use fees that 
most members of the public cannot afford. Recognizing the grave harm that 
may be caused by monopolization of certain natural resources, courts have 
repeatedly used the public trust doctrine to prevent navigable waters and the 
lands underneath them from being held under proprietary control. These 
resources inherently have public trust status because they are indispensable 
for commercial activities239 as the “highways of commerce.”240 Therefore, 
the public trust doctrine aimed at keeping navigable waters open for all 
commercial activities, as the court concluded, “is founded upon the 
necessity of preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from 
private interruption and encroachment.”241 
CONCLUSION 
 Based on the new social–political theory that I propose in this Article, 
the public trust doctrine resonates strongly with Justice Holmes’ view that 
law is “[t]he felt necessities of the time.”242 Indeed, the doctrine is by nature 
to “be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the 
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public it was created to benefit.”243 I have argued that with the expansive use 
of the public trust doctrine on various fronts, we have transformed the 
doctrine into what I call the “public trust principle” that protects the citizens' 
fundamental rights over public space. I have further demonstrated that these 
fundamental rights are by nature collective rights that are bestowed upon 
individuals as members of the public. To enforce the public trust principle, 
the public trust doctrine is a legal tool that promotes the stewardship ethic of 
protecting public space, with the government, the judiciary, and individuals 
as members of the public all being such stewards. Based on these arguments, 
I have also shown that this theory of the public trust doctrine is capable of 
yielding effective responses to the criticisms that have been leveled against 
the conventional ideas of the doctrine. 
 Given the paramount importance of public spaces in human 
development, we must strive to keep innovating our legal system with 
renewed vision and momentum. For the public trust doctrine, both history 
and contemporary reality have shown its great potential for defending public 
spaces. Now it remains up to us to capitalize on this legal tool to usher in 
more viable and socially sound policies and measures to protect public 
space. To accomplish this, it is incumbent on governmental officials, judges, 
and individuals to join together to reexamine the nature of our fundamental 
rights and social responsibilities. 
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